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PREFACE 
This study aims to analyse the suitability of the concept of Producer 
Subsidy Equivalents (PSEs) to serve as an Aggregate Measure of Support 
(AMS) in the Uruguay Round on the basis of which binding commitments 
can be made. The study is special in that it first describes both the scien-
tific discussion of the concept and the political discussion by the Con-
tracting Parties in the Uruguay Round (ending up in the final GATT 
agreement of December 1993). Subsequently it also confronts the scien-
tific conclusion with the agreed use of the AMS in the final GATT agree-
ment in order to see to what extent they coincide or differ. 
The main data sources that have been used are scientific articles, 
internal documents of the commission of the European Communities, 
GATT documents, and the publications of the OECD, USDA and the FAO. 
The study was originally carried out in 1992, after the appearance 
of the GATT Dunkel paper. However as the Dunkel paper was rejected, 
and thus the negotiations had to continue, there was no final statement 
in the negotiations about the AMS. Therefore also the publication of this 
study was postponed. When the GATT agreement was finally reached in 
December 1993, the study was picked up again and updated for the 
period since 1992. 
Both the first draft in 1992 and the updating have been carried out 
by Ir. C.P.C.M. van der Hamsvoort from the Socio-Economics division of 
the Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI-DLO). 
The author would like to thank Dr. E. Guth (at the time of the orig-
inal draft head of the division GATT Agriculture and Fisheries of the 
Commission of the European Communities) for the opportunity to gather 
the necessary information for the first draft. Drs. F.J. van der Valk (Dutch 
Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries) for providing 
the information necessary for the updating and for comments on an 
earlier draft. Ir. H.J. Silvis and Ir. F. van der Zee (Wageningen Agricultural 
University) and Drs. S. van Berkum (Agricultural Economics Research Insti-
tute (LEI-DLO)) are thanked for giving comments on the draft in 1992. 
Finally the author wishes to thank Drs. C.M. Rodenburg for correction of 
the English language. 
ThelDirector, 
The Hague, June 1994 ^/L.C. Zachariasse 
SUMMARY 
At the start of the Uruguay Round in 1986 the Contracting Parties 
suggested the development of an Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS). 
Due to the wide range of policies that the separate Contracting Parties 
of the GATT used to support agriculture, the old negotiating method of 
request and offer was considered to be no longer sufficient. An AMS 
might heap together this wide range of policies and should accordingly 
be used as a basis for binding commitments for all three target areas of 
the Uruguay Round. These are improvement of market access, export 
competition and reduction of internal support. Instead of taking a well-
known measure like the Nominal or Effective Rate of Protection or the 
Nominal or Effective Rate of Assistance, the Producer Subsidy Equivalent 
(PSE) was chosen as a basis for discussion. The reason for choosing the 
PSE was the combination of being able to cover almost all existing pol-
icies, its easy measurement and the fact that the OECD had already made 
calculations on the basis of the PSE concept. The other measures did not 
incorporate this combination. The nominal support measures, like the 
NRPp and the NRA had a too small policy coverage and the effective 
support measures, like the ERP and the ERA were too difficult to 
measure. 
The PSE was originally developed by Josling for the FAO (FAO, 1973; 
FAO, 1975) already more than fifteen years ago in order to measure the 
overall protection in agriculture. No attention however was paid to the 
PSE until it was chosen as a basis for discussion in the Uruguay Round. 
Since then the PSE has been broadly discussed in all its issues. 
The PSE for a product is measured by the difference between the 
domestic price and the external reference price for border measures and 
some internal support measures and by budgetary outlays for other 
measures. As the PSE was chosen as a basis for the discussion about the 
AMS in the Uruguay Round, the question is whether the PSE is also suit-
able to serve as an AMS in the Uruguay Round on the basis of which 
binding commitments can be made. 
When the PSE concept is analysed in a technical and economic way 
in order to answer this question, it reveals several problems when used 
in the negotiations. When related to the negotiations, all conceptual 
problems of the PSE can be summarized in the following: 
1. PSE levels are only partly controlled by a country; 
2. PSEs do not adequately reflect trade distortions. 
Subi: Due to exogenous changes, like world price fluctuations, fluctuat-
ing exchange rates, large countries changing their policies etc., 
the PSE of a country can change without changing its policies; 
Sub2: For example, an assumption of the PSE concept is that each dollar 
of assistance has the same trade effect. This is however an over-
simplification. An output subsidy for example has a larger trade 
effect than government expenditures for research and training 
have. 
Due to the above-mentioned reasons, from a scientific point of 
view, it must be concluded that the PSE is not suitable to serve as an 
AMS on the basis of which binding commitments can be made. The same 
conclusion can be drawn when the PSE is tested by five criteria that an 
AMS, according to Schwartz and Parker (1988), must meet when used as 
a negotiating measure. These criteria are transparency, simplicity and 
comprehensibility, flexibility, consistency and reliability. The PSE faces 
most problems with the criteria transparency, consistency and reliability. 
The fact that the PSE/AMS was not suitable as a basis for binding 
commitments was also recognized quite early by the Technical Group 
and the Negotiating Group on Agriculture in the GATT. Therefore three 
alternative optional uses for the AMS were put forward. The first one 
(option II, as the PSE as a basis for binding commitments is option I) is 
the 'target' option. Here the PSE serves as a basis for an agreed target, 
which should be achieved by commitments on policy measures. The sec-
ond alternative (option III) is the PSE in a monitoring role in order to 
control whether progress in the reduction commitments has or has not 
been made. In this case the PSE will not serve as a target nor as a basis 
for binding commitments. The third alternative (option IV) is to use the 
PSE to strengthen and clarify current GATT rules. 
The Contracting Parties also discussed the PSE, but in comparison 
with the scientific analysis they focused more on diplomatic/political 
issues. The most important issues for discussion were optional use, policy 
coverage, product coverage, country coverage, reference or base period 
(which would serve as a basis for reduction commitments), reference 
prices, monetary fluctuations and whether in case of supply control pol-
icy credits on the PSE should be given, as the positive trade effect of 
those policies is not fully reflected in the traditional PSE. Several Con-
tracting Parties put forward their points of view on the above-mentioned 
issues and also proposed derivatives of the PSE in order to solve some of 
the problems of the traditional PSE. For example the EC proposed the 
Support Measurement Unit (SMU) which differs from the PSE in its use of 
fixed external reference prices (to solve the problem of fluctuating world 
prices and exchange rates). Canada proposed the Trade Distortion Equiv-
alent (TDE), which should solve the problem of the PSE of not adequate-
ly reflecting trade distortions. It divides all policy measures in three 
groups, the fully distorting (all incorporated in the TDE), the partially 
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distorting (incorporated with some corrections) and the non-distorting 
measures (excluded from the TDE). 
In fact there were as many different proposals as their are Contract-
ing Parties. A compromise of all the proposals was reflected in the final, 
however preliminary, Dunkel paper, which appeared in December 1991. 
In this paper many problems of the PSE were solved by excluding the 
target areas of market access and export competition from the AMS and 
applying them only to the area of internal support measures. (Although 
the Dunkel paper speaks of the AMS, this is the aggregate PSE concept, 
on various points adapted to the wishes of the negotiations). Both the 
targets of improvement of market access and export competition were 
realized by separate commitments on the traditional offer and request 
basis. Within the internal support area a reduction commitment was 
proposed on the basis of the AMS of 20%. This reduction commitment 
was intended to apply to the AMS of each individual basic product. In 
order to distinguish which policies would be exempted from the AMS 
calculation and thus the reduction commitment, two general criteria and 
specific criteria per policy measure were developed. The measures should 
meet these criteria in order to be exempted from AMS commitments. 
The Dunkel paper was however rejected by the Contracting Parties. 
One of the problems with the proposed use of the AMS was that the 
AMS of each individual product would have to be reduced with 20%. 
This largely restricted the ability of the Contracting Parties in deciding 
how to realize the reduction commitment as a whole. Therefore, on the 
basis of the Dunkel paper, the EC and the US agreed upon a bilateral 
agreement in December 1992, called the Blair House agreement. With 
respect to the AMS these two big trade blocks decided to use the AMS in 
a different way than what had been proposed in the Dunkel paper. The 
reduction commitment of 20% would not apply to the AMS of each 
individual product but to the Total AMS of all products together. This 
would give the Contracting Parties the opportunity to reduce the AMS of 
one product with more than 20%, without changing the AMS of an 
other product. Moreover it was agreed by the EC and the US to exempt 
the direct income support, implemented in the EC in the view of the EC 
Common Agricultural Policy, from the internal support reduction. 
The Blair House agreement was consequently introduced in the 
negotiations with the other Contracting Parties, on the basis of which a 
final GATT agreement could be reached. This final agreement was 
reached in December 1993. With respect to the AMS the point of view as 
laid down in the Blair House agreement was adopted in the final agree-
ment. Moreover clear conditions were developed and described to 
exempt direct payments under production-limiting programmes from the 
AMS calculations. A major change in the area of export competition was 
that the reduction of export quantities of 24% that had been proposed 
in the Dunkel paper was reduced in the final agreement to 21%. In the 
area of market access, the final agreement differs from the Dunkel paper 
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in that it describes conditions for a so-called 'special treatment'. That is 
conditions are given in order to exempt policies from tariffication. 
In theory the AMS is used in the final GATT agreement in option I 
and option III, namely as a basis on which binding commitments are 
made and for the monitoring role thereafter. However due to the fact 
that the AMS is only applied to the internal support area and due to the 
fact that within this area so many exemption possibilities have been 
provided, the use of the AMS in practice is minimal. Therefore it can be 
concluded that in the GATT basically the same conclusion is drawn as in 
the scientific analysis, namely that the PSE/AMS cannot be used as a basis 
for binding commitments, although in the GATT it is reflected in another 
way. One must therefore conclude that the economic science has, by way 
of the PSE, not been able to provide the GATT with an AMS that could 
meet all needs. For the moment it is impossible to find an AMS that 
meets all criteria and can therefore be used as a basis for binding com-
mitments. The expectation therefore is that also in the Rounds to come, 
the discussion will to a large extent still take place on the basis of the 
traditional offer and request method. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and definition of the problem 
Previous GATT negotiating Rounds were conducted on a request 
and offer, item by item, instrument basis (GATT, 1988a). The Contracting 
Parties of the GATT however regarded this traditional negotiating pro-
cedure as unsuccessful. At the start of the Uruguay Round in 1986 they 
therefore expressed the desirability of finding an Aggregate Measure of 
Support (AMS), which could compare the widely different policies pro-
tecting agriculture and distorting trade and bring them under one 
denominator (GATT, 1987d). Then they would negotiate and make bind-
ing commitments on the basis of the AMS, in order to achieve the tar-
gets of the Uruguay Round as agreed upon by the Contracting Parties in 
Punta del Este in 1986 (GATT, 1990): 
1. improvement of market access; 
2. reduction of internal support; 
3. improvement of export competition. 
The Contracting Parties chose the Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) 
as a basis for the discussion about the AMS. In doing so, the following 
questions were raised from a scientific point of view. 
1. Why has the PSE been chosen as a possible AMS in trade negoti-
ations instead of another measure of support? 
2. Is the PSE concept, from a technical and economic point of view, 
suitable to serve as an AMS in trade negotiations on the basis of 
which binding commitments can be made? 
3. How is the PSF or a derivative finally used as an AMS in the 
Uruguay Round? 
1.2 Aim of the study, methodology and outline of the report 
The aim of the study is to find an answer to the above-mentioned 
questions, or summarizing: 
the aim of the study is to analyse whether the PSE concept is suit-
able to serve as an Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) in the 
Uruguay Round on the basis of which binding commitments can be 
made. 
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In order to meet the aim of this report a detailed study of both 
scientific and political documents has been made. The sources of infor-
mation used are scientific publications, internal documents from the 
Commission of the European Communities, documents of the GATT and 
publications of the OECD, USDA and the FAO. 
The questions raised in section 1.1 are subsequently dealt wi th in 
the fol lowing chapters. Chapter two starts wi th a brief overview of the 
most important current measures of support and a comparison wi th 
regard to policy coverage and data requirement. The purpose of this 
chapter is to analyse why the PSE has been chosen as a basis for discus-
sion in the Uruguay Round instead of another measure of support. In 
chapter three the PSE concept is analysed in detail from an economic and 
technical point of view to see whether the PSE as a concept is suitable to 
serve as an AMS in the Uruguay Round. In this chapter not only purely 
economic problems wil l be dealt wi th but also practical problems that 
the PSE may face once it is used in the negotiations. 
Chapter four gives a brief overview of the discussion as pursued by 
the Contracting Parties in the Uruguay Round wi th respect to the AMS, 
ending up with the final GATT agreement as achieved in December 1993. 
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the more diplomatic issues 
related to the AMS/PSE discussed in the Uruguay Round as opposed to 
the purely technical and economic analysis of chapter four. Chapter five 
finally presents the conclusion in which answers to the aforementioned 
questions are summed up, based on the analysis in the previous chapters. 
Moreover the scientific point of view on the PSE concept as described in 
chapter three will be contrasted to the view on the concept in the 
Uruguay Round as reflected in chapter four, on the basis of which some 
conclusions will be drawn. 
Finally it is mentioned that the analysis fol lowed in this report con-
tains interesting information for both scientists and policy makers, for 
whom measures of support, and especially the PSE, is a field of expertise. 
Besides the report is interesting for people who just want to know more 
about the concept and its possible uses. 
First of all the scientific analysis of the PSE concept in all its 
elements as pursued in chapter three, surveys all aspects related to the 
PSE in view of its possible use as an AMS in the Uruguay Round. 
Secondly, the scientific analysis is followed by an outline of the 
discussion on the PSE concept by the Contracting Parties in the Uruguay 
Round. Policy makers and civil servants who work in this area are prob-
ably familiar w i th the information in this chapter, but since it is based on 
GATT documents that are not freely published it is unlikely that it is 
known to all scientists involved in this area. 
Thirdly, the outcome of the scientific analysis of the PSE concept is 
confronted wi th and compared to its use finally agreed upon in the 
Uruguay Round. At the same time it is analysed whether the final propo-
sal in the Uruguay Round is in accordance with the conclusion drawn 
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from the technical and economic analysis. This confrontation or combina-
tion of the scientific view with the political view as laid down in the 
GATT agreement is new and has, as far as the author knows, not been 
done before. This will therefore probably be the most interesting part of 
the report for both scientists and policy makers. 
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2. WHY THE PSE IS CHOSEN AS BASIS FOR 
THE AMS DISCUSSION IN THE URUGUAY 
ROUND 
2.1 Introduction 
The Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE), which was introduced by 
Josling (FAO, 1973; FAO, 1975), is a prominent aggregate measure pro-
posed for use in the negotiations. The concept has been popularized by 
the work of the OECD (1987) and the USDA (1987) by giving calculations 
for some products and some countries. This increased both its political 
visibility and the comprehensibility with respect to the resources used for 
its calculation (Josling and Tangermann, 1987). 
Besides the PSE there are however other, more traditional measures 
of support, like the NRP, ERP etc. The target of this chapter therefore is 
to analyse why the PSE is chosen as a basis for the AMS discussion in the 
Uruguay Round and not one of the other alternatives. For this purpose 
section 2.2 of this chapter briefly outlines five of the best-known 
measures of government intervention: 
1. Nominal Rate of Protection to producers (NRPp); 
2. Nominal Rate of Assistance or Price Adjustment Gap (NRA or PAG); 
3. Effective Rate of Protection {ERP); 
A. Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE); 
5. Effective Rate of Assistance (ERA). 
These five measures of support are described both in words and in 
mathematical terms and compared with respect to the range of policies 
included and the amount of data required. Of course there are other 
points of comparison. However a completely elaborated comparison of 
the five above-mentioned measures of support is very difficult and would 
require a separate study. This is not the aim of the analysis and would 
therefore go beyond the scope of this chapter and this study. 
Section 2.3 contains the conclusion and tries, on the basis of section 
2.2, to answer the question why the PSE has been chosen as a basis for 
discussion in the Uruguay Round instead of another measure of support. 
2.2 Five measures of government intervention briefly compared 
2.2.1 Introduction 
In this section five measures of government intervention will be 
explained and compared with regard to policy coverage and the amount 
of data required for their calculation. Except the PSE the other four 
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measures can be classified by distinguishing between the terms 'protec-
t ion ' and 'assistance' and between 'nominal' and 'effective', as shown in 
f igure 2.1. 
Protection Assistance 
Nominal 
Effective 
Nominal Rate of 
Protection (NRP) 
Effective Rate of 
Protection (ERP) 
Nominal Rate of 
Assistance (NRA or PAG) 
Effective Rate of 
Assistance (ERA) 
Figure 2.1 Classification of four measures of government intervention 
The word 'protection' is used here to refer to intervention designed 
to protect domestic producers from foreign competition. Such interven-
t ion methods influence domestic market prices for domestically produced 
goods and for inputs used in their production. Such policy measures are 
said to provide border protection and include ad valorem tariffs, which 
are applied as a charge in terms of percentage on the value of imports. 
They also include specific tariffs (levied as a given amount per unit) and 
import controls (Haszler and Parsons, 1987). 
The word 'assistance' has a broader definit ion. Assistance includes 
all the intervention captured in the definition of protection and many 
other forms of intervention by governments, such as input subsidies and 
farm reconstruction assistance (Haszler and Parsons, 1987). 
The word 'nominal' is used to cover policy measures that have their 
impact on the unit returns received by producers for their output. That 
is, measures that affect market prices and the administered returns to 
producers. The effect of import tariffs on the prices received by pro-
ducers is included, as are direct production subsidies. However import 
tariffs on production inputs are not included under the heading nominal 
(Haszler and Parsons, 1987). 
The word 'effective' covers measures of intervention that include 
both assistance to the outputs of an industry and measures that influ-
ence prices of the industry's inputs, through assistance designed to sup-
port its inputs supplying industries (Haszler and Parsons, 1987). 
2.2.2 The Nominal Rate of Protection for Producers {NRPp) 
The Nominal Rate of Protection for Producers (NRPp) for any given 
commodity /' in a particular country is defined as the relative difference 
between the domestic price {PD) and the world price (PWj) of that com-
modity. Such a difference may be due to intervention at the border by 
means of tariffs or other means of driving a wedge between domestic 
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and world market prices (Haszler and Parsons, 1987). In algebraic terms, 
the NRPp can be defined as in appendix 1, where the ratio PDi/PWi is 
often termed the Nominal Protection Coefficient. Policies captured by the 
NRPp include border measures and producer subsidies and taxes that 
change producer prices. Taxes and subsidies on intermediate and primary 
inputs are excluded, as are lump-sum and other income transfers that do 
not affect current production levels (such as decoupled income support; 
see appendix 2) (Schwartz and Parker, 1988). Therefore the NRPp 
encompasses policies that protect producers by providing them wi th a 
higher market price than they would get in free trade (GATT, 1987d). 
The NRPp, however, only partly indicates how government policies influ-
ence domestic production, as it ignores the effect of support to inter-
mediate inputs. Because of its small policy coverage (appendix 2), the 
NRPp is however the most simple measure. It includes only the support 
to output prices brought about through intervention at the border and 
therefore only needs information about the domestic prices and the 
world market prices. 
2.2.3 The Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) or Price Adjustment Gap 
(PAG) 
The Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) is defined as the relative dif-
ference between unit gross returns to producers for domestic output 
(RDf) and the world price (PI/I/,) of the commodity of interest. The differ-
ence is due to border measures and other forms of assistance that direct-
ly affect producers' unit gross returns. For the algebraic definit ion, see 
appendix 1. The NRA is a more comprehensive measure than the NRPp is, 
since it incorporates all assistance to output. However it does not take 
into account the assistance to intermediate inputs, which means that 
only gross assistance rather than net assistance is measured. It is there-
fore a quite simple metric to measure as no detailed input or output 
coefficients are required. The NRA is however not as simple as the NRPp 
is, because also direct assistance to output, which is not reflected in the 
domestic price, has to be transformed to a basis per unit and added to 
the domestic price. Miller (1986) used the term Price Adjustment Gap 
(PAG) to describe the NRA. 
2.2.4 The Effective Rate of Protection (ERP) 
Whereas the NRPp encompasses policies that affect a farmer's gross 
returns, the Effective Rate of Protection (ERP) encompasses policies that 
also affect input costs. The ERP is thus a more general measure (GATT, 
1987d). The ERP is defined as the relative difference between, on the 
one hand, the value added per unit of output at domestic prices (VAD), 
incorporating the effects of border measures that influence prices for the 
specified commodity and the prices of the inputs used in producing it 
and, on the other hand, the value added at world prices (VAW) for the 
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outputs and inputs (appendix 1). Value added is defined as the return to 
the primary factors of production (land, labour, capital) used in a particu-
lar activity or industry and is measured as the value of the final output 
minus the costs of purchased intermediate inputs (Haszler and Parsons, 
1987). Corden (1985) states in his essays that, in the trade literature, the 
ERP has been used to analyse resource allocation among sectors in an 
economy. The ERP, however, can be viewed as an 'extended nominal 
rate', calculated as a weighted average of the impact of trade policies on 
output and intermediate inputs, where the weights are fixed input-out-
put coefficients. Used in this way, the ERP is an aggregate measure of 
protection that captures the net price effect of policies applied through-
out an economy (Schwartz and Parker, 1988). Therefore Schwartz and 
Parker (1988) state that by including intermediate input prices, the ERP 
provides a better indication of how government policies alter producer 
incentives than the NRPp does. Calculating an ERP for a commodity, 
however, requires an estimate of the NRPp for the output good, NRPcs 
for all intermediate goods, including non-agricultural products, and a set 
of undistorted input-output coefficients. These required data are quite 
detailed and therefore not always available (Schwartz and Parker, 1988). 
2.2.5 The Effective Rate of Assistance (ERA) 
The Effective Rate of Assistance (ERA) is defined as the relative dif-
ference between the value added per unit of output measured wi th the 
assistance structure (assisted value added, AVAj) and without the assist-
ance structure (unassisted value added, UVA}) (appendix 1) (Haszler and 
Parsons, 1987). This measure takes account of assistance to output, to 
purchased intermediate inputs (for example fertilizers) and to value add-
ing factors (for example, land and capital). Besides it considers the direct 
effect on prices of intermediate inputs of protection given to industries 
producing the inputs, and has thus the broadest policy coverage (appen-
dix 2). With respect to the data necessary for its calculation, it faces the 
same problem as the ERP does in that it requires very detailed data, like 
input-output coefficients, information about the value added, direct 
assistance per unit of output or related to the price, etc. This information 
is not always available. 
2.2.6 The Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) 
All the measures listed here can be negative as well as positive. In 
addition, all these measures can be expressed as subsidy equivalents. 
According to Webb (1984) a subsidy equivalent can be defined as the 
single monetary value needed to compensate the recipients of benefits 
of policy interventions for the removal of the particular intervention(s) of 
interest. 
While the concept of subsidy equivalent is quite general, it has been 
given a particular application by Josling in his concept of the Producer 
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Subsidy Equivalent (PSE), which he developed in the early seventies for 
the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) as a measure of support 
for agriculture (FAO, 1973; FAO, 1975; Webb, 1984). 
The concept of Josling was however not given much attention, unti l 
the OECD in the early eighties started to make calculations of PSEs as 
part of the implementation of the Ministerial Trade Mandate on agricul-
tural trade 1). Calculations (also of Consumer Subsidy Equivalent (CSE)) 
were made for the period 1979-81 in seven countries (Australia, Austria, 
Canada, the European Community, Japan, New Zealand and the United 
States). These PSE and CSE estimates, together wi th extensive explana-
tions of the definitions and methodology, were published in the syn-
thesis report 'National Policies and Agricultural Trade' in 1987 and in the 
associated series of country reports on these seven country studies 
(OECD, 1991) 2). 
Mainly on the basis of this OECD report the PSE concept has since 
then been extensively discussed in all its aspects, not the least because it 
was chosen as a basis for the discussion about the AMS in the Uruguay 
Round. This discussion has developed the PSE concept in its definit ion, 
function, contents, etc, wi th which we wil l deal in the fol lowing chap-
ters. Although these discussions have largely revealed the abilities of 
PSEs, the methodology is still not fully agreed upon. The OECD remarks 
for instance in one of her reports containing PSE estimates, that 'the 
methodology used in the calculations continues to evolve through a 
process of constant review within the Organisation. In particular, the 
calculation of the market price support element of the beef and milk 
estimates is still the subject of examination' (OECD, 1991, pp. 113). 
The definition and policy coverage of the PSE have of course also 
evolved over t ime by way of the discussions, and as mentioned before, 
they are still evolving. For the purpose of this chapter, the definition and 
policy coverage of the PSE wil l be given as currently used by the OECD. 
The OECD (1992, pp. 231) defines the PSE as 
'Assistance to producers as measured by the value of transfers to 
farmers generated by agricultural policy. These transfers are paid 
either by consumers or by taxpayers in the form of market price 
support, direct payments and other support' 
The OECD includes five categories of agricultural policy measures in 
their calculations of PSEs (OECD, 1992, pp. 243): 
1) Even though the PSE already existed for fifteen years and while the FAO 
carried out calculations on the basis of the PSE, which were updated every 
two years, in order to give an indication of world agricultural protection. 
2) Based on subsequent prolongations of the Ministerial Trade Mandate after 
1987, the OECD published several reports with (among other things) esti-
mates of PSEs (OECD, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992). 
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1. Market Price Support, all measures that simultaneously affect pro-
ducer and consumer prices, for instance import restrictions by means 
of tariffs, levies, and quotas, export subsidies, etc; 
2. Direct Payments; all measures that transfer money directly from 
taxpayers to producers without raising consumer prices, like defi-
ciency payments; 
3. Reduction in Input Costs; all measures that lower input costs wi th-
out distinguishing between subsidies to capital and those to other 
inputs; 
4. General Services; measures that in the long term reduce costs but 
which are not directly received by producers (for instance research 
and development expenditures (Schwartz and Parker, 1988)); 
5. Other Indirect Support, mainly sub-national subsidies (this is, 
measures funded nationally by Member States in the case of the 
European Community) and tax concessions. 
The PSE calculations do not include all transfers generated by agri-
cultural policies. They exclude for instance certain budget outlays on 
agricultural policy measures that are not received by producers, such as 
subsidies specific to food processing and distributing sectors, outlays that 
are not specific to the agricultural sector, outlays for stockholding and 
budgetary payments associated with measures that result in the perma-
nent withdrawal of resources from agriculture (OECD, 1992, pp. 243-244). 
With respect to the Reduction in Input Costs, the PSE includes sub-
sidies on intermediate inputs. However, taxes on intermediate inputs, 
like tariffs on farm machinery or higher prices of feed grains for livestock 
farmers resulting from crop support programmes, generally are not 
included 1) (Haszler and Parsons, 1987). 
In terms of policy coverage the PSE is a mix between the ERP, the 
NRA and the ERA (see appendix 2). Its policy coverage is larger than in 
case of the ERP and the NRA, but smaller than the ERA (which includes 
all intermediate input policies). However, the advantage of the PSE as 
compared to especially the ERP and the most complete measure wi th 
respect to policy coverage, the ERA, is that the PSE needs less data and is 
therefore simpler to calculate (see appendix 1). Its calculation is com-
pletely based on the price gap (domestic price minus world market price) 
and data about budgetary expenditures (GATT, 1987d). 
2.2.7 Policy Coverage in Practice 
Some authors demonstrate that in practice, the differences between 
the four measures of support wi th respect to policy coverage are smaller 
1) The OECD, though, also estimates a PSE, called Net PSE as opposed to 
Gross PSE, which includes distortions in the costs of feed. We will return to 
this point later. 
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than they seem to be. According to Schwartz et al. (1988) policies wi th 
direct price effects, border measures, output and input price subsidies, 
make up between 80% and 90% of the total value of PSEs for most 
developed countries. Border and output price policies compose more 
than 70%. The US Department of Agriculture estimates that the Price 
Adjustment Gap accounts for well over 80% of support provided to 
farmers in Japan and the European Community (Haszler and Parsons, 
1987). Schwartz and Parker (1988) therefore state that whatever measure 
is taken in trade negotiations, any significant reduction in such a 
measure should lead to a substantial increase in market access and reduc-
t ion in trade distortion. 
2.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter five measures of support have been explained and 
compared wi th regard to policy coverage and the amount of data requi-
red. One of those, the PSE, is chosen as a basis for the AMS discussion in 
the Uruguay Round. One of the questions posed in the introduction of 
this chapter was why the PSE was chosen rather than another measure of 
support. Following the analysis in this chapter, it can be concluded that 
the choice for the PSE is due to some practical and conceptual problems 
wi th the other four measures: 
1. the NRPp and the NRA, the nominal rates, have a too small policy 
coverage, as shown in appendix 2; 
2. the ERP and the ERA, the effective rates, have a large policy cover-
age, but face practical problems with respect to the detailed data 
required. For example, to include the intermediate input assistance 
in the calculation of the net support, detailed input-ouput coeffi-
cients are required, which are hard to get. 
The PSE has a policy coverage which can be measured between that 
of the ERP and the ERA (the ERA is conceptually the best measure wi th 
respect to policy coverage) but faces a much smaller need of data. The 
PSE does not require detailed input-output coefficients to calculate the 
net assistance to the product concerned due to intermediate inputs, but 
measures this by using budgetary expenditure data. This also means that 
not all the assistance to intermediate inputs is taken into account. For 
instance, direct assistance to the producer of the intermediate input is 
not considered. 
Summarizing, it can be stated that the major attraction of the PSE 
at the political level beyond the other measures, is due to the combina-
t ion of two qualities: 
1. policy coverage; the PSE captures the combined impacts of many 
different policies; 
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2. ease of calculation; it is calculated largely through the difference 
between domestic prices and external reference prices (multiplied 
by the applicable quantity) and the expedient of adding up dollar 
amounts of transfers before dividing by quantity (to get back to a 
measure per unit) or by sales value (to get back to a measure in 
terms of percentage). 
This combination of qualities makes the PSE a very flexible measure, 
which can be adapted (to certain limits) in negotiations as desired. 
A third reason for the choice of the PSE was that estimates of the 
PSE were already available for some products and some countries due to 
work of the FAO, the OECD and USDA, which represented a considerable 
increase in both their political visibility and in the resources devoted to 
their calculation (Josling and Tangermann, 1987). 
In the next chapter the PSE concept will be analysed in greater 
detail. 
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3. SUITABILITY OF THE PSE AS AN AMS IN 
GATT NEGOTIATIONS 
3.1 Introduction 
At the start of the Uruguay Round in Punta del Este in 1986 the 
Contracting Parties of the GATT expressed the necessity of an Aggregate 
Measure of Support (AMS) in the negotiations. With such a measure of 
support they wanted to put the wide variety of existing agricultural pol-
icy measures and trade distortions under one denominator. When the 
Contracting Parties would be able to reach agreement on such an AMS 
(in definit ion, policy coverage, methodology, etc), it could serve as a 
basis on which binding commitments could be made wi th respect to the 
reduction of support levels. The AMS could then replace the traditional 
offer and request method. 
As analysed in the previous chapter, the PSE was chosen as a basis 
for the discussion about a possible AMS due to its potential policy cover-
age and its easy calculation. Besides the OECD had popularized the 
measure by publishing in 1987 PSF estimates for seven countries (large 
trading partners in the GATT) and thirteen commodities, on the basis of 
the first Ministerial Trade Mandate. After the replacement of the first 
Trade Mandate, the OECD was asked to fol low and describe the reform 
of the agricultural policy (as agreed in global terms in OECD circles), 
which implied pursuing the calculation of PSEs (Silvis, 1994, forthcoming). 
After the start of the Uruguay Round, the USDA (1987) also began 
to make PSE estimations, mainly due to the decision of the Contracting 
Parties of the GATT to put agriculture high on the political agenda of 
the Uruguay Round. The estimations of the USDA were intended to sup-
port the American negotiators in the GATT wi th information about the 
agricultural and trade policy of other countries. 
The aims of the OECD and the USDA for the PSE are therefore of a 
descriptive nature, which coincides with the aim for which the concept 
has originally been developed by the FAO (Silvis, 1994, forthcoming). As 
described at the beginning of this section the PSE (as an AMS) was 
intended for a more ambitious use in the GATT. The analysis in this chap-
ter wi l l therefore be focused on the suitability of the PSE concept to 
serve as an AMS in GATT negotiations, on the basis of which binding 
commitments could be made. This wil l be done by analysing the PSE in 
all its elements from a technical and economic point of view, therewith 
referring to the consequences of its use in the negotiations. 
Section 3.2 wil l therefore start wi th the definition of the PSE and 
the data necessary for the calculations. In the previous chapter the cur-
rently accepted definition was given. This is however the evolved defini-
t ion that resulted from the many discussions after the start of the 
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Uruguay Round. It is however not the definition that the discussion in 
the Uruguay Round started with. 
In section 3.3 some measurement issues of the PSE will be discussed. 
Among the most difficult measurement issues are policy coverage, the 
treatment of supply control policies and exchange rates. 
In section 3.4 the PSE will be evaluated in its function as indicator of 
trade distortions and finally in section 3.5 some conclusions will be 
drawn. 
3.2 Definition of PSE, policy coverage and required data 
3.2.1 Definition 
In chapter two the definition of the PSE was given as currently 
applied by the OECD (1992, pp. 231): 
'Assistance to producers as measured by the value of transfers to 
farmers generated by agricultural policy. These transfers are paid 
either by consumers or by taxpayers in the form of market price 
support, direct payments and other support (...)' 
This was not the definition the OECD gave in her summary report 
containing PSE estimates in 1987. At that time, as mentioned before, the 
PSE had not gained much attention yet. This explains why there was no 
clear view on how the PSE should be interpreted and for what kind of 
problems it could potentially be used. Different authors therefore gave 
different definitions. The OECD gave in her report the following defini-
tion (OECD, 1987, pp. 100): 
The PSE is defined as the payment that would be required to com-
pensate farmers for the loss of income resulting from the removal 
of a given policy measure 
Tangermann et al. (1987) define the concept of PSE as follows: 
It is the subsidy that would be necessary to replace the array of 
actual farm policies employed in a particular country in order to 
leave farm income unchanged. It can be thought of as the 'cash 
value' of policy transfers occasioned by price and non-price means. 
as: 
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA, 1987) defines it 
A PSE is an estimate of the revenue required to compensate pro-
ducers if existing government programmes were eliminated. 
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Schwartz and Parker (1988) finally state the following: 
The producer subsidy equivalent measures the percentage of current 
gross farm income for producers of a commodity that comes from 
government programmes. This roughly translates into the compen-
sation that would be required in the absence of sectoral policies to 
maintain sector income at its protected level, assuming fixed output 
and constant world prices. 
Peters (1989a) however demonstrates that all the above definitions, 
except the one used by the USDA, misinterpret the PSE concept by talk-
ing about (one way or the other) 'income loss', which is a misnomer of 
'revenue loss'. This can easily be demonstrated in figure 3.1. 
In figure 3.1 'S' is the supply curve of a given product and 'D' the 
demand curve. Under free market conditions, the product price is the 
world market price Pw, domestic production is Q v domestic consumption 
D.| and imports are D1-Qv In this situation the PSE is zero. Let's assume 
that the government intervenes by implementing an import tariff of PD-
Pw per unit. The domestic price for both the producer and the consumer 
will increase to PD, domestic production will increase from Q1 to Q2, 
domestic consumption will, due to the higher domestic price, decrease 
Price 
PD 
O Q i Q D; Quantity 
Figure 3.1 PSE as a measure of revenue loss or income loss 
Source: Peters (1989a). 
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f rom D, to D2 and finally the imports wil l decrease from D^Q, to D2-Q2. 
The total PSE, measured by the difference between domestic price and 
external reference or world market price, multiplied by domestic produc-
t ion (PD-Pw)*Q2' w ' " D e PDBFPW. However, this is not purely income for 
the farmers as suggested by the above definitions. Namely the triangle 
BEF forms the extra costs for the farmer due to the increase in produc-
t ion from Q1 to Q2. Moreover, even without any costs for the individual 
farmer, not all transfers as measured by the PSE are income transfers. For 
instance one dollar of support in terms of research and extension are in 
the PSE calculations treated in the same way as one dollar of direct 
income support. The support by means of research and extension is how-
ever by no way a direct income transfer, while the direct income support 
is. Thus only part of the total PSE is an income transfer to the farmer, the 
other part is a transfer to cover the extra costs. The total PSE indicates 
therefore the 'revenue transfer' due to the government policy. A re-
moval of the policy will therefore indicate a loss of revenue for the 
farmer and not a loss of income. 
A second problem wi th the above definitions is that it suggests that 
PSEs measure dynamic effects, i.e. that it measures the loss of income 
resulting from the removal of a given policy measure (Silvis, 1994, for th-
coming). However all variables, which are the basis for PSE calculations 
are assumed independent from each other. This means that in the PSE 
calculations it is assumed that when one or a couple of policy measures is 
abolished, this wil l cause no quantity or price reactions. The PSE is there-
fore a static measure. It summarizes and reflects the situation wi th 
respect to the assistance to producers at a particular point in time. 
3.2.2 Total PSE or ratio PSE 
PSEs can be expressed in various ways. The OECD currently expresses 
the PSEs in four different manners (OECD, 1992, pp. 244): 
1. Total PSE: the total value of transfers to producers; 
2. Percentage PSE: the total value of transfers as a percentage of the 
total value of production (valued at domestic prices), adjusted for 
direct payments and levies; 
3. Unit PSE: the total value of transfers per tonne; 
4. Nominal Assistance Coefficient on Production (NAC): the ratio of the 
border price plus the Unit PSE to the border price. 
As said earlier the PSE takes subsidies on inputs into account, but no 
taxes on inputs that result from market price support to the producers of 
these inputs. The OECD however makes in their calculations an exception 
for feed. That is, the feed adjustment to the PSE calculation for all live-
stock products is made to take account of the effect of market price 
support for feed grains, oilseeds and taxes on processed feedstuffs used 
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in animal feed 1). The OECD therefore calculates two different Total 
PSEs. Transfers to producers before deduction of the feed adjustment is 
called Gross PSE, while transfers to producers after deduction of the feed 
adjustment is called Wet PSE. 
In algebraic form, the above PSE expressions can be wri t ten as 
(OECD, 1991, pp. 116-117; adapted from OECD, 1992, pp. 244): 
1. Total PSE (TPSE): 
a. Gross PSE = Q*(PD-P^ + DP - LV + OS (3-1) 
b. Net PSE = Q*(PD-Pw) + DP - LV + OS - FA (3-2) 
2. Percentage PSE = 100*TPSE I (Q*PD + DP - LV) (3-3) 
3. Unit PSE (PSEu) = TPSE I Q 
Pw + PSEu 
4. NAC = (3-4) 
PW 
where: Q = volume of production; 
PD = domestic producer price; 
Pw = world price (reference price) at the border in national 
currency; the import (c.i.f. 2)) or export (f.o.b. 3)) 
price of a commodity; 
DP = direct payments; the value of budgetary outlays paid 
directly to producers, as subsidies on farm output or on 
the primary factors used to produce it (i.e. land, labour 
and capital); also includes stabilization and disaster pay-
ments; 
LV = levies on production; taxes on farm output that reduce 
the price received by producers as a result of market 
price support; 
OS = all other budgetary-financed support; the value of trans-
fers that indirectly benefit producers. Includes explicit or 
implicit subsidies on purchased inputs, farm credit, agri-
cultural research and development extension services, 
education and agricultural infrastructure minus any 
taxes or levies on farm inputs (except for feedstuffs). 
Also includes subnational assistance measures and tax-
ation concessions directed at agriculture; 
1) The purpose of the feed adjustment is to allow commodity Total PSEs to 
be summed up to give a total for the agricultural sector without double-
counting the market price support paid by livestock producers to producers 
of PSE feeds, and also to deduct any other taxes on feeds or on processed 
feedstuffs (OECD, 1991, p.116). 
2) Cost, insurance and freight. 
3) Free on board. 
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FA = feed adjustment (only for livestock products); the sum 
of the additional costs of animal feed to livestock pro-
ducers as a result of market price support on feeds for 
which PSEs are calculated and taxes on feeds and pro-
cessed feedstuffs. 
In appendix 1 another algebraic definition of Total PSE than pres-
ented above has been given, for reason of comparability with the other 
measures mentioned there. The policy coverage expressed by the equa-
tion in appendix 1 is however exactly equal to the Gross PSE as men-
tioned above. We have used here the algebraic definitions as applied by 
the OECD, because these are the expressions most commonly used. 
The advantage of expressing PSEs as a ratio is that this may facili-
tate comparison of PSEs over products, countries or time (GATT, 1987a). 
Tangermann et al. (1987) for instance, are of the opinion that, if complex 
tables should make sense across commodities and countries. Percentage 
PSEs are needed as the simplest possible aid to inspection (since they 
lend weight to comparative levels). There are however also some disad-
vantages in interpreting PSEs expressed as a ratio. McClatchy (1987) 
remarks that, since a change in support affects both the numerator and 
the denominator, the proportionate change in the Percentage PSE is not 
consistent with the proportionate change in the corresponding Total PSE. 
Another, related problem of Percentage PSEs was demonstrated by 
Peters (1989b). He showed that a move from market price support (MPS) 
to other support (OS) in such a way that Total PSE will not change, will 
change the Percentage PSE as Other Support (OS) does appear in the 
numerator of the Percentage PSE (see equation (3-2)), but not in the 
denominator. Peters states that 'all of these could be avoided by nothing 
more fundamental than a change of base. Unsupported revenue as the 
denominator is unambiguous' (Peters, 1989b). From a scientific point of 
view this is true. However from a negotiating point of view the question 
remains of how to determine unsupported revenue. 
The remark of McClatchy with respect to Percentage PSEs is basically 
equally valid for both other ratio PSEs mentioned above (Unit PSE, and 
NAQ. Changes in Total PSEs can be caused by all elements that consti-
tute Total PSE as given in equation (3-1). When for instance the volume 
of production (Q) increases and the direct payments (DP) decrease, such 
that Total PSE remains equal. Unit PSE will change due to the increased 
denominator (Q). 
The OECD recognized this problem and started in 1990 with the 
decomposition of Total PSEs in its constituting components. By identify-
ing the relative importance of the various PSE components they tried to 
explain the overall yearly change in PSEs for the chosen aggregate 
(OECD, 1992, pp. 246). The OECD presented the decomposition in graphi-
cal form using a tree structure to clarify the relationships between the 
components of assistance, like in figure 3.2. The decomposition involves 
breaking down the change in Net Total PSEs into a production volume 
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(Q) and in the Unit PSE (PSEu). The change in PSEu has in turn been bro-
ken down into a series of unit value components: market price support 
(MPSu), output levies (LVu), direct payments (DPu), other support (OSu) 
and feed adjustment (FAu). Market price support itself is further decom-
posed into a domestic producer price component (PD) and a border price 
in domestic currency (Pwnc). The latter in turn is made up of an 
exchange rate component and a border price in US dollars (OECD, 1992, 
pp. 246). For each component, two indicators are calculated. The first 
indicator is an index measuring the alteration in the component. The 
other indicator measures the contribution, in percentage points, of that 
alteration to the overall change in the Net Total PSE. The contribution is 
derived by weighting the index by the share of the component in ques-
tion in total assistance in the base year from which the index is calcu-
lated. As these shares may vary from year to year the impact of the same 
relative change in a component may also vary from year to year. The 
contribution can be interpreted as the relative change that would have 
occurred in the Net Total PSE if nothing had changed. The sum of the 
contributions from all components equals the relative change in Net 
Total PSE (OECD, 1990, pp. 95) 1). 
PSE 
PSEu 
MPSu LVu +DPu +0Su -FAu 
-P. nc 
XR 
Figure 3.2 Decomposition of the changes in the Net Total PSE 
Source: OECD, 1992, pp. 257. 
1) This means that the changes in components are regarded as independent 
from each other. As this is rarely the case in practice, the results of the 
decompositions have to be interpreted with care (Silvis, 1994, forth-
coming). 
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The Nominal Assistance Coefficient (NAC) as a way to express PSEs, 
has been introduced by the OECD in 1991 (OECD, 1991, pp. 135). Equa-
t ion (3-4) above indicates that the NAC is calculated as the implicit refer-
ence border price in national currencies (Pw) plus the Unit PSE (PSEu), 
divided by the implicit reference border price in national currencies (Pw). 
The NAC in fact measures the wedge between domestic and world prices 
as created by agricultural policies. According to the OECD (1991, 
pp. 135), an indication of these price wedges is useful in evaluating pol-
icy developments. A NAC of one, for instance, indicates that domestic 
prices are not insulated from world prices. As the value of the wedge 
rises, the NAC wil l increase and vice versa. The OECD (1991, pp. 135) 
remarks that the advantage of transformation of Unit PSEs in NACs to 
compute price wedges on the production side instead of Percentage 
PSEs, is that the latter measures transfers relative to the gross revenue of 
producers. Therefore it obscures the extent of the wedge between 
domestic and border prices and hence the degree of distortion in produc-
t ion. The implicit assumption underlying this statement is that each dol-
lar of assistance has the same incidence on distortion in production. This 
is especially questionable for assistance in the form of research, exten-
sion, etc. The OECD is aware of this, but remarks that 'the measures for 
which the distortion effect is expected to be minimal, account for only a 
small share in total assistance, thus the error implied is likely to be 
minimal' (OECD, 1991, pp. 144). 
Besides the four mentioned ways of expressing PSEs, which are most 
frequently used, there are also other manners of expressing PSEs, which 
wil l be briefly mentioned. Tangermann et al. (1987) and Peters (1989b) 
have put forward the already mentioned Percentage PSE in which the 
PSE is expressed as a percentage of producer revenue valued at world 
prices instead of domestic prices as in equation (3-2). In such a ratio the 
PSE is comparable to an ad valorem tariff. Other ways of expressing PSEs 
are a PSE per farmer and a PSE per unit of farmland. The latter ratios 
have been presented only once by the OECD in 1991 (OECD, 1991, 
pp. 133) and are uncommon. 
Finally it has to be mentioned that apart from expressing PSEs as a 
total or as a ratio, PSEs can be calculated per commodity, per group of 
commodities, per sector, country, etc. However, as this is rather a political 
issue than one of definition, it is not dealt wi th in this chapter. 
3.2.3 Policy coverage and data 
3.2.3.1 Policy coverage 
The advantage of the PSE is that it is able to cover almost the whole 
range of support measures that might operate. In the original version of 
Josling/FAO, the measurement was geared essentially to expressing the 
effects of all policies that could reasonably be thought to be commodity 
specific. The OECD (1987) broadened the definition by including more 
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general measures like government expenditure on research, extension, 
etc, which are not necessarily commodity specific (see previous section). 
The USDA (1987) in its analysis for a large number of countries, 
broadened the definition further by including some of the effects of 
exchange rate distortions in the case of developing countries. 
Inclusion of a wide range of policies has the advantage of avoiding 
the switching from included policy instruments to excluded ones while 
negotiating, to keep up protection while apparently observing the 
agreement (Josling and Tangermann, 1987). However by including almost 
all the policies, like the OECD and the USDA, one assumes that each dol-
lar of assistance has the same production (and hence trade) effect. This is 
an oversimplification which both organizations neglect in their reports in 
1987 1). There is fairly widespread agreement that any measure that 
falls into the categories of 'market price support', 'direct income sup-
port', 'indirect income support' (policies affecting variable production 
costs) and 'programmes affecting marketing costs' should always be 
included. For the policies not falling under these categories the main 
question is whether these policies provide decoupled assistance or not 
(GATT, 1987d). Peters (1989b) defines decoupled as follows: 'a lump sum 
revenue transfer which provides no incentive to alter output given the 
price level. Further there would be no trade diversion impact'. By con-
trast any policy measure which shifts the supply schedule is not decou-
pled. The question is, whether a decoupled payment should be included 
in the PSE1 This is both an economic and a political question. In this 
chapter only the economic side of the medal will be dealt with. 
Tangermann et al. (1987) propose in their article a simple categori-
zation of policy instruments into three groups: 
1. 'pure' transfers that are agreed upon to have no measurable output 
and trade effects; 
2. instruments that encourage output directly or indirectly through the 
increase in farm profitability without supply control; 
3. instruments that involve supply control with or without payments. 
The policies under 1 are decoupled and could be ignored if PSEs are 
used in negotiations. For policies under 2, negotiation on the basis of 
implied PSEs would directly improve the trading system. The principal 
problems arise with the policies in the third group. These problems will 
be discussed in the next section where measurement issues will be dis-
cussed. 
To conclude one could say that the PSE is flexible in that it can 
measure most (not all) of the policy measures applied by the different 
1) In more recent reports, the OECD pays attention to this problem as indica-
ted in the previous section where the NAC concept was discussed. 
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countries. Which policy coverage will be chosen when PSEs would be 
used in negotiations is therefore a political question. 
3.2.3.2 Data 
Most estimates of the Total PSE value are measured in one of two 
ways (GATT, 1987a; GATT, 1987c; McClatchy, 1987; OECD 1991; USDA, 
1987): 
1. the wedge that a policy instrument (or mix of instruments) drives 
between domestic and external prices; 
2. the budgetary effects of government policies. 
Market price support policies act to separate domestic and external 
prices. The PSE part for those policies is measured by the first way men-
tioned. In fact in this way, the border measures, internal measures and 
programmes to support export (in whatever way) are generally spoken 
measured together. Thus the contribution of an individual measure to 
the protection level is hidden. 
Most other policies can be measured by data from budgetary out-
lays. Some policies are measured by a combination of the two. To give a 
clear and extended overview of policy coverage, the way they are 
measured in the PSE and examples of products per country to which a 
policy is applied, a table is given in appendix 3, which is in fact an over-
view of the USDA report of 1987. 
3.3 Measurement issues 
In the following subsections the measurement problems that the 
PSE faces will be discussed and proposals will be given of how these 
problems could possibly be solved. 
3.3.1 Policy coverage 
Section 3.2 described what policies can normally be measured by the 
PSE. However there are some policies which from an economic point of 
view should be taken into account, but which are some way or the other 
not measured by the PSE, or not accurately measured. Examples are 
income tax rates, intermediate product taxes, supply control policies, 
voluntary export restraints etc. The problems that arise with these poli-
cies with respect to the PSE will be described in the following subsec-
tions. 
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3.3.1.1 Income tax rates 
The current PSE concept as used by the FAO, OECD and USDA 
focuses on differential treatment between population groups within a 
society, not between farmers in different countries. Thus income tax 
rates would be excluded from the calculation for a given commodity if 
they equally apply to farmers and other groups. Thus substantial differ-
ences between countries in income tax rates applying to farmers, would 
not be captured by the PSE (McClatchy, 1987). 
3.3.1.2 Trade at favourable conditions and food aid 
PSE calculations of national and international organizations gen-
erally do not take into account trade at favourable conditions and food 
aid. There is a possibility that for example food aid is incorporated in the 
PSE by the price gap between domestic price and external reference 
price, as this method does not distinguish between the destination of 
production benefiting from support. Whether this is true or not is not 
known (GATT, 1987a). However in negotiations, the inclusion of trade at 
favourable conditions and food aid into the PSE calculations, raises a 
number of additional difficulties wi th respect to the PSE concept and its 
calculations (GATT, 1987a). These are: 
1. the impact of food aid on trade is not absolutely clear. This aid may 
decrease trade demand or encourage it. Or it is, according to the 
normal commercial import criterion of the FAO, almost neutral wi th 
regards to trade; 
2. further, even when one could identify the origin of these effects, it 
would be difficult to calculate their impact on the reference price 
element in the PSE calculations. 
3.3.1.3 Intermediate input assistance 
PSEs do include government policies, which subsidize inputs for 
farmers, but they exclude the effects of government policies on inter-
mediate product prices which fall to the producers of these intermediate 
inputs (USDA, 1987). Thus they do not consider the indirect effects of 
other policy measures on the costs of farm inputs. For example, in some 
countries farmers are effectively taxed by government protection or 
regulation of other sectors such as farm machinery, fertilizers, and trans-
portation. These effects are not reflected in the PSE calculation. The 
reason for not being incorporated in PSEs is that it raises practical dif f i -
culties, because a set of input-output coefficients is required, which is 
very difficult to get. However exclusion from the PSE involves that PSEs 
cannot be accurately compared over countries, when used in the negoti-
ations. 
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In section 3.2.2 it was already mentioned that in this respect the 
OECD makes an exception in her calculations of PSEs for animal feed 
costs in the PSE on livestock, therewith transforming Gross Total PSEs to 
Net Total PSEs. By means of the animal feed costs, we will show what 
happens when government policies on intermediate inputs that fall to 
the producers of these inputs are not taken into account in the PSE cal-
culations for the final product. 
High prices for feedstuffs clearly act as negative subsidies (i.e. taxes) 
on the livestock industry. Omission of these policies from the calculations 
would overstate the incentive effect of high support levels for livestock 
product prices, much of which might merely offset higher feed costs 
(Tangermann et al., 1987). The effect of the omission of assistance to 
feed producers from livestock PSEs are demonstrated in figure 3.3. 
Price 
PD' 
PD 
Q i 0.2 Dz D 3 Di Quantity 
Figure 3.3 Effect of the exclusion of assistance to feed producers out of live-
stock PSE 
Source: adapted f rom Peters (1989a). 
S in figure 3.3 is the livestock supply curve when feed inputs are 
unprotected. PD is the supported domestic price for livestock. When sup-
port for cereals, used for the production of feed stuff, is introduced, this 
will raise the price for feed stuff and hence shifting the livestock supply 
upwards to the left to S'. Now assume that the internal livestock price is 
raised to PD', in order to offset the higher feed price and therefore main-
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taining the livestock production level Q2. The Total PSE, previously 
PDBFPW (Pw is the world market price) rises to PD'GFPW. Apparently there 
is greater protection. However the factors of production (total revenue 
minus intermediate input costs) are receiving exactly the same reward in 
the two situations. Thus if internal prices are raised to compensate for 
feed costs the erroneous impression is given that the value of protection 
has increased. 
3.3.1.4 Supply control policies 
According to Josling and Tangermann (1987) the issue of supply 
control and how this is handled by the PSE is the most serious analytical 
issue of the PSE, reason why it will be discussed here in detail. 
The best-known supply control measures are the milk quota system 
in the EC, started in 1984, the milk production quota system in Canada 
and the acreage reduction programmes in the US (USDA, 1987). From an 
economic point of view, those countries, which effectively restrict domes-
tic production through supply control policies, should receive 'credits' on 
the PSEs for the commodities concerned, for at least two reasons. 
1. traditional PSEs overestimate the effect on quantities produced and 
hence on trade; 
2. 'contribution' to balancing international markets. 
The first argument implies that the total transfers to producers as 
measured by traditional PSEs overestimate the effect on produced quan-
tities and hence on trade, due to the fact that part of the transfers to 
producers is pure 'economic rent' to which producers cannot react by 
expanding production because of the supply restriction (GATT, 1987a; 
Tangermann et al., 1987). In figure 3.4. the above problem is demonstra-
ted. In this figure, S is the existing domestic supply curve of the commod-
ity, D the domestic demand curve, PD the domestic supported price level 
and Pw the world market price. Now consider three situations: 
A: production quota established at the existing production level Q2, 
ceteris paribus; 
B: production quota established at 90% of the existing production 
level, which means at Q3. The price remains at PD and there are no 
compensatory direct payments; 
C: production quota established at 90% of the existing production 
level (Q3). The price remains at PD and the producers will be com-
pensated by direct payments up to the revenue level in the situation 
without a quota. 
Ps is the price necessary to achieve the same reduction in production 
as with the quota system. 
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Figure 3.4 PSEs in case of supply control 
The Total PSE, Unit PSE, the Percentage PSE and the NAC in these 
cases are given in figure 3.5 together wi th a numerical example (Q2 = 
1,000 tons, Pw = 30 units and PD = 50 units). 
The starting situation is of course the same situation as A because of 
the fact that the production quota has been established at the existing 
level. In situation B however one can see that while the 7ota/ PSE has 
changed, the Unit PSE, Percentage PSE and NAC have not changed. Thus 
the PSEs expressed as a ratio have not changed while the production and 
thus in fact the total support has declined. Situation C is probably even 
more clear. Total production has decreased and total revenue to the 
producers has not changed, but the Total PSE, Unit PSE, Percentage PSE 
and NAC increased. 
Without the quota system, though, Ps would have been the necess-
ary price to reduce the total production to the same level as wi th the 
quota system. So whatever the producers receive above the price level Ps 
they may not produce more than Q3. Thus all the assistance or revenue 
provided by government policies beyond the area OPsMQ3 is an 
'economic rent'. In the traditional PSE one does not take the existence of 
an 'economic rent' into account. 
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Situation Total PSE Unit PSE Percentage PSE NAC 
of supply 
control 
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PSEu 
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Start 
A 
B 
C 
20,000 
20,000 
18,000 
23,000 
20.0 
20.0 
20.0 
25.6 
OPDGQ2 Pw 
40.0 1.67 
40.0 1.67 
40.0 1.67 
46.0 1.85 
Figure 3.5 PSEs in three different cases of supply control 
The second reason why the PSE should be adapted in order to be 
able to allow a credit for supply control policies, is not an economic rea-
son but a reason originating from an international trade perspective, 
wi th which the PSE has to deal when used in the negotiations. 
Countries pursuing supply control policies make a 'contribution' to 
balancing international markets, even if the primary objective of supply 
controls is domestic, such as to affect budget savings. From a purely 
economic point of view, supply controls lead to domestic inefficiencies in 
resource use. However, from an international trade perspective supply 
control policies contribute in a positive way by reducing 'overproduction' 
and hence limiting the distortion of international trade that would 
otherwise occur. When the country is large, this may raise the world 
price; consequently other countries' PSE for this commodity wi l l decrease, 
wi thout having changed their policies. This may of course also recom-
pensate the country itself, though a small country (dealing wi th supply 
control) wil l not enjoy this advantage. 
Due to the above reasons countries pursuing supply control policies 
should receive some reductions of their measured commodity PSEs, when 
used in the negotiations. The question however is by how much the PSEs 
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should be reduced in order to take into account the effect of supply 
control policies. Theoretically the PSE for a product under supply control 
should be reduced exactly by the part of the overall amount of support 
that is beyond the support which would have sufficed to induce farmers 
to produce the quantity supplied under the supply control scheme. In 
order to do this properly, the 'shadow price' (Ps in figure 3.4) for the 
commodity concerned would have to be estimated, which is however 
practically almost impossible. 
Therefore various authors, both scientists and politicians have tried 
to f ind a solution for the above problem. All the contributions to this 
problem can be summarized in three main options, of which the first 
two are practical solutions and the third one gives a solution which is in 
accordance wi th economic theory. 
1. a lump sum of x% credit (Commission of the European Commun-
ities, 1988d; Tangermann et al., 1987); 
2. credit categories based on a 'self election approach' (Tangermann et 
al., 1987); 
3. mathematical approaches that mainly try to estimate the above-
mentioned 'shadow price' or try to estimate the 'would-be-produc-
t ion level' at current supported prices (Commission de la Commu-
nauté Européenne, 1988a; Commission of the European Commun-
ities, 1988d; GATT, 1988a; GATT, 1988e). 
Subi: According to Tangermann et al. (1987) one possibility is to define 
a limited number of categories of supply control policies and 
agree on flat rate relative reductions of the PSEs as traditionally 
measured for these categories (say 10, 20 and 30% reductions). 
Criteria have to be defined in order to allocate the supply control 
policies in categories according to the extent to which they 
reduce domestic production below what would have been produ-
ced in the absence of the policies concerned. They also state that 
agreement on such criteria will be difficult. 
In a document of the Commission of the European Communities 
(1988d) dealing wi th the problem of how to incorporate the EC 
quota system into the PSEs it is stated that a first attempt was 
made using a lump sum of 20% as a credit for the milk quota 
implemented in 1984/85. Calculations, though, carried out under 
this assumption indicated that a straightforward application of a 
fixed relative amount will not sufficiently reflect economic reality. 
Sub2: The second approach, mentioned by Tangermann et al. (1987) is 
based on the 'self-election' approach of the countries concerned 
and provides political incentives to contribute to improvement of 
the situation in international trade. Countries that believe they 
pursue effective supply control policies could be granted a given 
relative reduction of the PSE concerned (say 30%) if they would 
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agree to bind the Total PSE (in million dollars) (because of the 
Percentage PSE problem with supply control measurement men-
tioned earlier). The result of this approach would be that such 
countries, as long as they do not expand the volume of domestic 
production, would then be subject to the equivalent price disci-
plines in PSE per ton. If they are less sure about their own pol-
icies, they would be free to choose the Percentage PSE (rather 
than the Total PSE), although by doing so they would forego the 
supply control 'credit'. The advantage of this method is that no 
agreement on international level is necessary to see if a domestic 
supply control policy is actually restricting domestic production 
effectively. The government of the country concerned could make 
its own choice under this 'self-election' approach. 
Sub3: In a document of the Commission of the European Communities 
(1988d) it is proposed to incorporate the EC milk quota system 
into the PSE by a more refined approach than the lump sum 
approach. Besides an estimation is made of the product price 
change necessary to obtain an equivalent supply level as fixed by 
the quota system under the hypothesis of a simple trend and 
price elasticity component of the quantity development. The fol-
lowing supply function served as the underlying production func-
tion for EC milk supply: 
Oft) = ex.(Tt + w(P(t))) (3-5) 
In which: Q(t) = milk supply at time t; 
P(t) = milk price at time f 
w = supply price elasticity and; 
Tt = the trend coefficient representing all other than 
price induced effects on milk supply (auton-
omous trend, technical changes, productivity 
increases, etc). 
Canada submitted a discussion paper in the light of the GATT 
negotiations (GATT, 1988a), in which a revision of the Unit PSE was 
made in order to better reflect trade distortions. One of the modifi-
cations dealt with market price support in case of production 
quotas, which will be briefly explained here. 
The idea can be reflected by figure 3.4 (as presented in this sec-
tion). In this figure, without supply control, production would be Q, 
at world market price Pw and Q2 at supported domestic prices PD. 
With supply control at Q3, the 'shadow price' (as defined earlier) is 
Ps. Thus the production distortion is only (Q3 - Q^ and the per unit 
dollar value corresponding to this actual distortion is (Ps - Pw), 
which is called the production distortion equivalent (PDE). On the 
demand side, the existence of managed supply makes no difference 
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to the distortion of consumption as the consumer price remains at 
PD. The difference (PD - Pw) is called the consumer tax equivalent 
(CTE = -CSE, consumer subsidy equivalent). The relative importance 
of volume distortions will depend on the slopes of the supply and 
demand curves. If these slopes are unknown then the adjustment 
formula for the Unit PSE is given as: 
adjusted Unit PSE = O.S (CTE + PDE) (3-6) 
adjusted Unit PSE = 0.5 (CTE + (PSEU - W*i)) (3-7) 
Where: CTE = consumer tax equivalent; 
PDE = producer distortion equivalent; 
PSEU = unadjusted Unit PSE; 
W = observed market-determined value of the entitle-
ment to produce one unit per year; 
i = prime interest rate (or equivalent) in the country 
in question. 
As one can see, the PDE in (3-6) has been replaced in (3-7) by (PSE 
- W*i). This is because in practice there are problems with determin-
ing the 'shadow price' (Ps) and thus the PDE. Therefore 'W*i' is 
introduced, the marginal economic rent accruing to producers at 
quantity Q3 and price PD, which should indicate the difference 
between the domestic price (PD) and the 'shadow price' at Q3 (Ps). 
The only guide to the value of 'W*i' in practice is its capitalized 
value, namely the market price for production entitlements (W). 
Multiplying by the interest rate ' i ' consequently gives an indication 
of the price difference (PD - Ps). It follows that a correction as pro-
posed here is only possible where production quotas are held at the 
individual farm level. 
In the event that there is agreement on the slopes of the supply 
and demand curves (dS and dD respectively), then the formula 
would be: 
adjusted Unit PSE = 0.5 (-dD*CTE/dS +(PSEU - W*i)) (3-8) 
Where: dD = slope of demand curve; 
dS = slope of supply curve. 
3.3.1.5 Quantitative import restrictions and voluntary export restraints 
In the PSE concept, quantitative import restrictions are incorporated, 
together with a lot of other policies, by the price gap between domestic 
prices and external reference prices. However this immediately raises the 
problem of desegregation. It is very difficult to estimate in advance the 
modification in PSE resulting from a reduction of quantitative restrictions 
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or to estimate to what extent the PSE has to be reduced in order to elim-
inate quantitative import restrictions (GATT, 1987a). 
The same could be stated for voluntary export restraint agreements 
(VERAs). VERAs and some other instruments of protection against 
imports lead to higher c.i.f (cost, insurance, freight) prices for the import-
ing country because of the existence of 'contingentai rents'. The protec-
tionist effects of such measures are not measured by PSEs as they raise 
the c.i.f price which is used in this case as external reference price. For 
example, replacement of an import tariff by an equivalent VERA would 
lead to a reduction in the PSE as usually measured, wi thout reducing 
protection for domestic producers (Tangermann et al., 1987). A solution 
to this problem, in accordance wi th economic theory, would be to esti-
mate wi th economic models (which include supply and demand coeffi-
cients) the effect of quantitative import restrictions and VERAs on 
domestic and world market price levels. This way the different effects of 
different policies included in the price gap could be unravelled. Though 
this solution is theoretically ideal, for the negotiations it would involve 
that supply and demand coefficients and economic models have to be 
available for all products and all countries incorporated in the calcula-
tions. As some authors considered this to be almost impossible, they 
proposed some practical solutions, though not fully in accordance wi th 
economic theory. 
1. estimation of ' true' c.i.f prices. This means c.i.f prices of the same 
commodity in other importing countries whose comparable imports 
were not subject to such measures (GATT, 1987a; Tangermann et al., 
1987); 
2. 'rule of thumb'. The PSE of the commodity concerned would be 
increased by x percent automatically, unless the importing country 
were to provide evidence that a lower increase is justified 
(Tangermann et al., 1987); 
3. traditional negotiations on the basis of offer and request about the 
levels of import quota, their administration etc. This solution has 
been put forward by a technical group in the GATT, dealing wi th 
the AMS. They state that it is impossible to modify the PSE techni-
que wi th respect to the measurement of policies like VERAs (GATT, 
1988f). 
3.3.1.6 Public stockholding activities 
Public stockholding activities can appear in PSE calculations both by 
the difference between domestic prices and external reference prices and 
by the budgetary expenditures by governmental organizations to cover 
the storage costs itself. The question is whether according to economic 
theory these stockholding activities are accurately measured by the PSE. 
First of all it should be mentioned that, as wi th the quantitative import 
restrictions and the VERAs, their effect on the domestic and world mar-
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ket prices is disguised as also other policies are measured by this price 
gap (GATT, 1987a). Secondly, unlike most types of agricultural support 
measures, the relationship between net government expenditures on 
stockholding activities in a given year and the world market price effect 
of such activities in the same year is quite variable. To the extent that 
stock accumulation by a given country provides support to world market 
prices it will have a (small) production increasing effect in all countries 
with prices linked to the world market, and not only in the country bea-
ring the cost. However permanent accumulation of public stocks is not a 
long-term viable means of farm revenue support (GATT, 1988a), as once 
in the future they will appear on the market. 
Therefore from an economic point of view stockholding activities 
should be omitted from the PSE indicator, on the grounds that their 
direct influence is on market supplies rather than production levels and 
that they are not long-term sustainable farm revenue support measures. 
Because their influence on the price gap is impossible to eliminate, this 
will imply that in practice only the direct budgetary expenditures related 
to stockholding activities can be excluded from PSE calculations. 
3.3.2 Large country case 
PSEs do not explicitly take into account the large country effects on 
world reference prices (USDA, 1987). The main point to be made on the 
large country problem is that any reductions or rises in domestic support 
levels for producers of a certain product are also likely to have an impact 
on the world price. Examples of countries that are large in this sense are 
the US (as a wheat exporter), Australia (as a wool exporter) and Japan 
(as a beef importer) (Haszler and Parsons, 1987). For example, if a large 
country protects domestic producers and expands production, this will 
tend to depress world prices. Since the PSE estimate would be based 
(directly or indirectly) on actual world prices, it would include not only 
the policy induced increase of the domestic prices, but also ensuing 
world price reductions. The resulting PSE will therefore be higher than 
without the world price effect and 'exaggerated'. Conversely, when a 
large country controls domestic supplies, world prices are higher than 
they would have been in the absence of these supply controls. The ques-
tion raised is whether the PSEs of large countries should be adjusted for 
their world price effects. According to economic theory no adjustment 
should be made, because the distorting effect of policies on the prices 
will only be fully reflected when actual world prices are used. 
Also from a negotiating point of view, various authors come to the 
conclusion that no adjustment should be made, due to the following 
reasons. 
1. large countries have particular responsibilities for the functioning of 
international trade (Tangermann et al., 1987). If they pursue policies 
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that depress world prices, there is no reason why this should not be 
measured; 
2. if on the other hand world prices increase due to domestic supply 
controls by large countries, this will also be reflected in the PSE, 
which will be lower than without this effect. Additional credit is not 
necessary; 
The OECD and USDA do not take the large country effect into con-
sideration but both acknowledge the problem. 
For the other (not only small) countries, facing the change in world 
price due to another country's policy, an adjustment could be made how-
ever. For policies of large countries that depress world prices of a certain 
commodity, will without adjustments increase the PSE for that commod-
ity in other countries without having changed their policies or their pro-
tection level. This problem, which is a more general one in PSE measure-
ment rather than only a large country effect, will be dealt with in the 
next section. 
3.3.3 Issues relating to external reference prices 
3.3.3.1 Introduction 
Within the overall PSE concept, the trade measures under market 
price support are normally captured as the difference between an inter-
nal price (producer price) and an external reference price. It follows from 
this procedure that a PSE may change when the external reference price 
changes, due to problems like world price and exchange rate fluctu-
ations, inflation and natural circumstances (GATT, 1988c; USDA, 1987). 
With respect to the negotiations, exogenous changes in external referen-
ce prices, which result in corresponding fluctuations in calculated PSE 
levels, are outside the control of governments (GATT, 1988a). Without 
corrections governments will not be keen on agreeing with commitments 
based on PSEs. In particular, what will happen if PSEs increase not 
because of policy changes in the country concerned but because of fall-
ing world prices or because of exchange rate changes? Would domestic 
prices (or subsidies) then have to be brought down in order to comply 
with the bound PSEsl 
In her calculations the OECD uses reference prices which are derived 
(as much as possible) from the market prices that prevail at the border of 
the various countries. For net importing countries this implies 'cost, 
insurance and freight' (c.i.f.) prices and for net exporting countries, 'free 
on board' (f.o.b.) prices. The reference prices thus differ per country and 
although the OECD acknowledges the problems mentioned, they do not 
make any corrections in their calculations. 
A look at the PSE calculations of the OECD, will set out the import-
ance of the problem. In their calculations the PSE decreases till 1984, 
while particularly in those years before 1984, one should expect a raise in 
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PSE levels due to decisions with respect to market and price policies. This 
controversial course of PSEs is due to the development in world prices 
and the increasing dollar value. An analysis of Buchholz (1989) of the 
OECD figures resulted in the same conclusions. 
The economic solution to this problem is to use reference prices and 
exchange rates which would be realized in a free trade situation. How-
ever, because it is (as yet) not possible to determine these prices, this 
problem can with respect to the negotiations be regarded as purely pol-
itical. Therefore the problems and their solutions as discussed in the fol-
lowing sections must not be regarded as purely economic, but more as 
practical solutions when the PSE would be used in the negotiations. 
3.3.3.2 Choice of external reference price 
Apart from the fact that external reference prices may change due 
to exogenous factors there are several other issues which make it fairly 
impossible to choose one unique world price per product as external 
reference price. 
First of all there are differences in product quality and in processing 
level. The OECD has tried to solve this problem in her calculations by 
using technical coefficients and price corrections (Silvis, 1994, forthcom-
ing). 
A second issue concerns the difference between the observed world 
price and the hypothetical 'free trade' price. The external reference 
prices used in the calculations of PSEs are normally derived from 
observed market prices, which are in fact also distorted prices (USDA, 
1987). The existing evidence points out that some commodities (e.g. dairy 
products) are much more distorted than others (e.g. oilseeds). One impli-
cation of this is that a given PSE for one commodity may be much more 
serious than a numerically similar PSE for another commodity if the 
world price of the first commodity is more artificially depressed than that 
of the second (McClatchy, 1987). This raises the question as to whether 
the actual (distorted) world price or the 'free trade' world price is the 
theoretically appropriate reference point. As already stated in the intro-
duction, from a scientific point of view a 'free trade' reference price has 
to be used, although such a price is hard to estimate accurately 
(Tangermann et al., 1987). A possible practical solution may therefore lie 
in a proposal to reduce only PSEs that are above a certain minimum level 
(agreed by the negotiating partners). 
Another issue relates to the appropriate external reference price 
being higher when a country is a net importer than when it is a net 
exporter. For an exporting country the relevant world price is the f.o.b. 
export price at its borders. For importing countries the relevant world 
price is the c.i.f. price (Haszler and Parsons, 1987). This may result in 
anomalies such as two neighbouring countries having the same support 
price level but different PSE values due to the fact that one is a slight 
net exporter and the other a slight net importer. Similarly a country's PSE 
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may suddenly rise from one period to the next without any change in 
support measures, but merely because the country moved from a slight 
net import to a slight net export position (McClatchy, 1987). One way to 
remedy the problem is to use c.i.f.-based prices for production up to total 
domestic consumption and f.o.b. prices thereafter (GATT, 1988j), as 
shown in figure 3.6 below. The shaded area illustrates the market price 
component of the PSE, i.e. the difference between the producer price P 
and the external reference price, Pc i f and Pf0t,< multiplied by the 
quantity produced (Q ). If as assumed in the graph, the domestic con-
sumption Qc is less than domestic production Q , two different prices are 
used as reference price when calculating the market price support, MPS: 
MPS = (Pp - Pcif) * Qc + (Pp - Pfob) * (Qp - QJ (3-9) 
Price 
P c i f 
Pf.o.b 
O Qc QP Quantity 
Figure 3.6 Influence of ci. f. and/or f.o.b. prices on PSEs 
Assuming that the black block on the right side in figure 3.6 repre-
sents all non-market support (DP, LV and OS in equation (3-1), aggre-
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gated here as NMS), then Total PSE, Unit PSE and Percentage PSE, are 
calculated as follows 1): 
Total PSE = MPS + NMS (3-10) 
Unit PSE = (MPS + NMS)IQp (3-11) 
Percentage PSE = (MPS + NMS)I(NMS + Pp * QJ (3-12) 
The economic justification of this approach is an extension of the 
marginal revenue reasoning. At the domestic market, a producer has to 
compete against the price of imported goods at the border, which can 
be considered as the marginal revenue of production. For the same rea-
son, for the part of production exceeding the domestic consumption, 
prices free on board at the border can be regarded as the marginal rev-
enue of production (GATT, 1988J). 
A final issue mentioned here, refers to the problem of fluctuating 
world prices. World prices can fluctuate a lot from year to year due to 
policy changes of large countries (see section 3.3.2), abnormal seasonal 
conditions (Haszler and Parsons, 1987), exchange rates (see next section) 
etc. Fluctuating world prices translates to fluctuating PSEs for countries, 
wi thout having changed policies. Most solutions for this problem men-
tioned in the literature focus on averaging world prices of several years 
(Tangermann et al., 1987; GATT, 1988a). 
3.3.3.3 Exchange rate and currency fluctuations 
Exchange rate variations essentially show up as world price move-
ments, but in behalf of surveyability they have not been discussed in the 
previous section but will be dealt wi th separately in this section. As 
external reference prices will vary due to exchange rate and currency 
fluctuations, the PSE wil l vary as well. That situation is illustrated in 
table 3.1 wi th the help of figures used by the OECD in calculating the 
PSE for wheat (GATT, 1988c). 
1) The solution of a combined use of c.i.f. and f.o.b. prices was put forward 
at a time when the earlier mentioned NAC had not been introduced yet by 
the OECD. Also thereafter the NAC has, as far as the author knows, not 
been discussed in this context. A possible formula for the NAC in this res-
pect would be: 
NAC = (Unit PSE + PJ/Pa 
where: Pa = (Pcif * Qc) + (Pfob. * (Qp - Qc)) 
% 
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Table 3.1 The influence of exchange rates and currency fluctuations on pro-
ducer prices and external reference prices of wheat in the EC and 
the USA in 1983 and 1985 
Prices in Year Price dif-
EC and USA ference (%) 
1983 1985 1983-1985 
ECU $ ECU $ ECU 
EC 
Producer price/ton 197.0 184.6 177.8 129.5 -9.7 -29.8 
External price/ton 175.0 163.8 124.0 90.3 -29.1 -44.9 
Price difference 22.0 20.8 52.8 39.2 140.0 88.5 
US 
Adjusted producer price *) 191.9 179.7 205.0 149.3 6.8 -16.9 
Producer price **) 138.5 129.7 155.5 113.2 12.2 -12.7 
Price difference 53.4 50.0 49.5 36.1 7.3 -27.8 
*) For the US the adjusted producer price equals the producer price increased by 
direct payments; for the EC producer price and adjusted price are identical; 
**) For the US the producer price is considered equal to the external price. 
Source: Adapted from GATT (1988c). 
Focusing our attention on the differences between the domestic 
producer prices and the external reference prices (as these are used 
directly in PSE calculations), the influence of exchange rates and currency 
fluctuations becomes clear immediately. The figures in the table show 
that the price gap for wheat increased in 1985 as compared to 1983 wi th 
140% when expressed in ECUs, while the increase was 'only' 88.5% when 
measured in US dollars. The incidence of exchange rates and currency 
fluctuations becomes even more clear when one looks at the develop-
ment of the price gap for producers in the US. When measured in ECUs, 
the price gap in 1985 as compared to 1983 increased wi th 7.3%, while it 
decreased with 27.8% when measured in US dollars. 
The presented figures clearly indicate that without correction com-
parison of national PSEs over time is impossible, because exchange rates 
and currency fluctuations influence the calculation of PSEs. From a purely 
economic point of view there are good reasons to adjust domestic mar-
kets to changes in exchange rates or currency fluctuations to the extent 
that they indicate changing international comparative advantages. In 
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practice this is very difficult. Therefore several possible practical solutions 
to this problem have been put forward in the negotiations: 
1. the choice of a reference year for the exchange rates to be used. 
This approach suffers from arbitrariness of the choice itself (Commis-
sion of the European Communities, 1988a); 
2. use of a moving average. However the choice of the period on the 
basis of which the moving average would be calculated is delicate 
since this period has to cover the range of considered fluctuations 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1988a); 
3. using a fixed external reference price, expressed in the currency of 
the party concerned (GATT, 1988c). However the problem of this 
approach is that it does not reflect the real economic situation. 
3.3.3.4 Inflation 
The problem of inflation appears automatically in PSE calculations, 
when PSEs and thus agricultural support policies of different countries 
are compared. From an economic point of view no correction for infla-
tion is necessary, because they are part of the actual economic situation 
in a country. From a negotiating point of view it seems, as stated in a 
document of the Commission of the European Communities (1989g), ap-
propriate to deflate the relevant support elements and derive a support 
level expressed in real terms. 
The same document mentions that international comparative statis-
tics offer two different deflators that can be applied. 
1. the Gross Domestic Production deflator (GDP); 
2. the Consumer Price Index deflator (CPI). 
Besides it is stated without further comments that the GDP deflator 
has certain advantages compared to the CPI deflator and should be used 
to deflate support levels in agriculture. In appendix 4, the two major 
deflators used for international statistics are demonstrated in table 1 and 
table 2 respectively, with 1986 as the base year. They seem to give com-
parable results. Table 1 shows that if EC 12's GDP deflator is applied to 
the level of support calculated for the period 1986 to 1990, the total 
support declines in line with the deflator and shows always smaller fig-
ures compared to those compiled in nominal terms. The difference 
between the two series (1986 and 1990) is defined by the deflated GDP 
index which shows in 1990 an amount of 119.5 on the base 1986 = 100. 
This implies that cumulated rates of inflation for the EC add up to 19.5% 
in 1990 as compared to 1986. In other words, the real monetary value of 
a given payment is only worth 80.5% in 1990 compared to 100 in 1986. 
From the same table can be seen that the deflated support levels for the 
US will evolve in a comparable way due to an almost identical price evol-
ution. Japan however would have less 'advantages' by applying the real 
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term notation as a result of the modest rates of inflation recorded in the 
past. 
3.4 PSE as an indicator of trade distortion 
3.4.1 Introduction 
As can be derived from the aims of the Uruguay Round as put for-
ward in chapter one (improvement of market access and export competi-
t ion and reduction of internal support), an AMS which would be used in 
the negotiations as a basis for binding commitments should not only be 
able to reflect the support levels provided by different policies, but also 
the extent to which those policies distort trade. 
Therefore in the next section the problems that the PSE faces in 
reflecting trade distortions wil l be discussed. In section 3.4.3 a derivative 
of the PSE, the Trade Distortion Equivalent (TDE), wil l be discussed, 
which intends to solve the problems that the PSE comes across in measur-
ing trade distortions. 
3.4.2 Problems of the PSE in measuring trade distortions 
While in general higher PSEs imply greater trade distortions, the 
magnitude of trade distortion is not proportional to the magnitude of 
the PSE. Positive PSEs can be associated with positive, zero or negative 
distortions of net export volumes (McClatchy, 1987). This is due to vari-
ous reasons. 
First of all the assumption inherent in the PSE concept is that each 
dollar of assistance has the same production (and hence trade) effect. 
This is clearly an oversimplification (Ballenger, 1988; Josling and Tan-
germann, 1987; OECD, 1987). Probably the most problematic example is 
formed by government expenditures for programmes like research and 
extension, which are treated in the PSE concept as if they are direct 
product subsidies. 
A second issue involves policy switching. The PSE concept includes 
the possibility of switching from included to excluded policy instruments 
to keep up protection while apparently observing a different PSE level. 
On the other hand it is also possible to switch between two included 
policy instruments, which reflect different trade distortions, while 
keeping the PSE level unchanged. This is possible due to the previously 
mentioned assumption of each dollar of assistance having the same trade 
effect. Ballenger (1988) states therefore that the mix of policies is impor-
tant for the real trade distortion. Hertel (1988) subsequently proved this 
by studying the trade effects of different policy mixes. He finally came 
up wi th eleven propositions on the effects of alternative types of agricul-
tural subsidies, which have been described in appendix 5. Hertel con-
cludes for example that the removal of an agricultural input subsidy wil l 
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have a greater impact on long-term output (and hence exports) than the 
removal of an equal-PS£ output subsidy will have (provided that the 
subsidized input is a substitute for land). 
Several of the fol lowing issues are related to the comments above, 
but wi l l be mentioned separately in order to get a better overview of 
the different issues. 
The first issue concerns different consumption effects. One country 
may support its farmers mainly through direct payments which do not 
affect consumption and thus trade, while other countries give the same 
level of support (measured in PSEs) through administered prices (with 
border controls) which do have these effects (Ballenger, 1988; McClatchy, 
1987; Peters, 1989a). Thus while two different policies can lead to equal 
PSE effects, they may have different consumption and therefore trade 
effects. 
Furthermore, the trade effects resulting from the support of a cer-
tain commodity can be influenced by the support given to another com-
modity. For instance, Canadian barley production (and consequently 
trade) would be much more affected by current rates of transport sub-
sidy and stabilization payments if these programmes only applied to 
barley rather than to other western grains as well. PSEs however do not 
measure these effects (McClatchy, 1987). 
Different supply response coefficients in different countries is a 
further impediment for PSEs to measure trade distortions correctly. A 
given level of PSE wil l stimulate production (and therefore trade distor-
tion) of a commodity or group of commodities more in a country where 
the price elasticity of supply is higher. A similar point applies wi th respect 
to the elasticity of demand and therefore to the extent that agricultural 
support affects consumer prices (Ballenger, 1988; GATT, 1988a; McClat-
chy, 1987; Schwartz and Parker, 1988). 
Although they have already been discussed in section 3.3.1.4, supply 
control policies are mentioned here again as another impediment for 
PSEs to measure trade distortions correctly. Supply control policies, like 
production quotas, fallow requirements, etc often constrain the produc-
t ion stimulating effect of price and income enhancing programmes. It is 
even possible that those policies can do more than offset the production 
stimulation of the higher farm product prices resulting in a negative net 
trade distortion from the overall commodity package, even when the PSE 
is positive (McClatchy, 1987; Peters, 1989a). 
A final, but not the less important issue mentioned here is the influ-
ence of a country's trade share. A country wi th a small PSF and a large 
world market share can have a bigger influence on trade and interna-
tional prices than a country wi th a smaller market share and a larger PSE. 
The PSE ignores this effect (Ballenger, 1988). 
The issues mentioned in this section demonstrate very clearly that 
the PSE concept as traditionally developed does not accurately reflect 
trade distortions. 
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Canada proposed to solve the problem by developing an adjusted 
PSE, called Trade Distortion Equivalent (TDE) , which wil l be described in 
the next section (GATT, 1988a). 
3.4.3 The Trade Distortion Equivalent (TDE) as an alternative for the 
PSE 
Since the PSE is such a poor proxy indicator for the degree of trade 
distortion contributed by countries' agricultural support measures, 
Canada proposed a more direct indicator of trade distortion, called the 
Trade Distortion Equivalent (TDE). The two principal issues involved in 
the measurement of a TDE using a 'modified PSE' approach are (GATT, 
1988a): 
1. The classification of all agricultural support measures into three 
groups: 
a. non-distorting. These include largely production neutral policies 
wi th little or no impact on production and trade. These policies 
wil l not be included in the TDE (TDE value zero); 
b. partially distorting. This group includes programmes incorpor-
ating some supply constraining features like supply management, 
set-aside, market-oriented stabilization schemes etc. The TDEs for 
these programmes are smaller than the corresponding (tradi-
tional) PSE, in that the PSE value would be adjusted downwards 
by a negotiated 'credit' factor, for example by corrections as 
demonstrated in section 3.3.1.4 for supply control policies; 
c. fully distorting. This group includes policies like open-ended 
price support and direct payments, and all export policies. For 
this group the TDE value wil l be the same as the PSE value. 
For a detailed list of policies included in the three groups I refer to 
appendix 6. For the group of fully distorting measures it is assumed that 
all such measures distort production to the same extent as a simple sub-
sidy of equivalent value does, and thus that the unadjusted PSE levels are 
also appropriate as a proxy indicator for the production distortion level. 
The question is now to what extent the TDE reflects trade distortions 
better than the traditional PSE does. The best way to do this is to evalu-
ate the TDE wi th respect to the problems of the PSE in measuring trade 
distortion enumerated in the previous section. A correction made on the 
original PSE tried in fact only to solve the issue concerning supply control 
policies. The assumption in PSEs of equal trade effects per dollar of assist-
ance is only partly solved by creating three groups of policy measures of 
which the non-distorting ones are left out. However for the fully distort-
ing group equal trade effects per dollar of assistance are still assumed, 
while Hertel (1989) showed that this is not always a valid assumption 
(see appendix 5). 
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With respect to the problem of policy switching a partly solution has 
been found to restrict the number of policies included, although within 
the group of included policies it is still possible to switch. The other 
issues mentioned, like different consumption effects. Non-tariff Trade 
Barriers (NTBs), different supply response coefficients, etc are neither 
dealt with by the TDE nor by the PSE. 
McClatchy (1987) also defined a TDE but in a different way: 
(3-13) 
TDE = (% PSE x Supply Elasticity x Domestic Production) - (% CSE x 
Demand Elasticity x Domestic Consumption) 
In which: CSE = Consumer Subsidy Equivalent (based on the same 
principles as the PSE) 
On surplus of equation (3-13) McClatchy proposes to incorporate a 
correction for supply control policies. The 'McClatchy TDE' in fact solves 
the problems of NTBs, different supply response coefficients and supply 
control policies but has no solution for the other trade distortion prob-
lems. 
To conclude one could state that although the TDE (in whatever 
formulation) reflects trade distortions better than the traditional PSE 
does, it still does not measure trade distortions correctly. Besides, the 
problems of the PSE as described in this chapter, like reference prices, 
large country cases, exchange rate fluctuations etc, also hold for the TDE. 
Therefore it cannot be stated, as Canada does (GATT, 1988a), that 'a 
major advantage of an aggregate measure such as the TDE is that it 
provides governments with the means to establish an agreed starting 
point and a specific and visible negotiating objective (i.e. reduce the TDE 
by X% over Y years)'. Probably a combination of the two proposed TDEs 
could solve the problem of trade distortion for a big deal, but it would 
need data (supply and demand coefficients, non-visible trade prices etc) 
which are probably not directly available and if they are, would also be 
subject to negotiations. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter it has been analysed whether the PSE concept may 
be suitable to function as a possible AMS in the Uruguay Round as a 
basis on which binding commitments can be made. 
The analysis in this chapter appears to lead to several conclusions. If 
countries choose an across-the-board approach to the issue of negoti-
ations on agricultural policies, the PSE has a number of advantages: 
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a. it can include a wide variety of domestic policy instruments; 
b. it can be tailored to exclude 'desirable' programmes, such as those 
that decouple income/revenue support f rom price incentives; 
c. it can be modified to handle supply control policies; 
d. it can be added up across commodities to give overall protection 
levels. 
However in this chapter it has also been shown that the PSE, when used 
as a possible AMS, faces several problems too. In fact all these problems 
can be summarized and reflected by two main headings: 
1. PSEs are only partly under a country's control; 
2. PSEs do not adequately reflect trade distortions. 
Sub1: PSEs normally alter whenever world prices alter due to exchange 
rate differences, important policy changes in other countries or 
because of (e.g. weather-related) variations in the world supply 
situation. Thus the level of a country's PSEs is only partly under 
the country's control; 
Sub2: Due to a number of reasons PSEs do not adequately reflect trade 
distortions. Therefore it is possible to reduce the PSE while in fact 
increasing trade distortion (the same counts for the opposite). 
The TDE, as proposed by Canada is only a partial solution of the 
problem. 
Despite their potential advantages it must be concluded that due to 
the above-mentioned problems, from a technical and economic point of 
view the PSE is not suitable to serve as an AMS in trade negotiations on 
the basis of which binding commitments can be made. 
In fact the PSE is just the first phase of the total analysis, namely the 
measurement of transfers between producers, consumers and taxpayers 
induced by agricultural policies. However the second phase consists of 
estimating the effects of removing this government protection on world 
trade flows and prices, on production and consumption at the national 
and international level and on farmers' revenue. Therefore the PSE can 
serve as input into a broader economic model, a kind of world policy 
simulation model, as being developed for example by the Economic 
Research Service of the USDA or the MTMM model as developed by the 
OECD. 
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THE PSE CONCEPT DISCUSSED BY THE 
CONTRACTING PARTIES OF THE GATT 
4.1 Introduction 
The complexity and the diversity of policy measures used to protect 
the functioning of systems to support revenues and internal prices have 
been, in past GATT negotiating rounds, one of the main hindrances in 
elaborating an aggregate and balanced approach to liberalize agricul-
tural trade. The Contracting Parties regarded past negotiations conduc-
ted on a request and offer basis as not successful (GATT, 1987a). At the 
start of the new GATT round, the Uruguay Round in Punta del Este in 
1986, Contracting Parties committed themselves to establish an agree-
ment on the progressive reduction and wherever possible the elimination 
of trade restrictions and distortions arising from government agricultural 
policies by September 1990 (which has later been postponed) (GATT, 
1990). In the specific negotiating proposals, made before the end of 1987 
by the US, Cairns Group, Canada and the EC, these countries call for a 
reduction across the board which can only be monitored by similarly 
comprehensive measures (Josling and Tangermann, 1987). The PSE was 
favourite and from that moment on its measurement has been discussed 
intensively in GATT circles. In fact the discussion wi th respect to the PSE 
dealt wi th issues of both conceptual and practical or diplomatic charac-
ter. Therefore the discussion by the Contracting Parties of the GATT was 
pursued by both the Negotiating Group on Agriculture (in code: NG5), 
which has primary responsibility for the sector in the Uruguay Round and 
dealt mostly wi th the diplomatic issues (proposals of the main agricul-
tural countries), and an established Technical Working Group (TG) whose 
only target was to deal wi th the AMS and related issues and therefore 
handled the conceptual issues (Ford Runge and Heimpel Stanton, 1988). 
The aim of this chapter is to give a brief overview of the discussion 
by the Contracting Parties in the GATT with respect to the AMS and to 
analyse the final proposal to use the AMS in the Uruguay Round as 
reflected in the resulting GATT agreement. As wil l become clear later in 
this chapter, the terms AMS, PSE and also other terms have been mixed 
in the negotiations. While one Contracting Party talks about the AMS, 
the other talks about the PSE, etc. As the discussion of the Contracting 
Parties wil l be fol lowed, also in this chapter the terms wil l be used 
interchangeably. In order to avoid misunderstandings though, the 
relationship between the various terms wil l be clarified. The AMS is an 
aggregate name for all measures of support. This term was used at the 
start of the Uruguay Round, as it was not yet known which measure of 
support would finally be used. However, as the PSE was chosen as the 
basis for the discussion about the AMS, in the negotiations (and also in 
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this chapter) the two terms are considered to reflect the same, namely 
the PSE concept as discussed in the previous chapter. Also other measures 
of support, which have been introduced (as wil l be shown later) during 
the negotiations by the various Contracting Parties, are all derivatives of 
the PSE. They all reflect the PSE concept, adapted on one or more points. 
The intention as put forward at the start of the Uruguay Round was 
to look for an AMS, on the basis of which binding commitments could be 
made and which would therefore cover all three target areas (market 
access, internal support and export competition). However the discussion 
in the Technical Group (which wil l not be repeated here) recognized 
quite early that it would be very difficult to use the AMSIPSE as a basis 
for binding commitments due to the same reasons as revealed in chapter 
three (GATT, 1988d). Therefore both the NG5, technical group and 
scientists proposed some additional optional uses for the AMS, which wil l 
be enumerated and discussed in section 4.2. In section 4.3 a brief 
overview wil l be given of the most important issues wi th respect to the 
AMS in the Uruguay Round and the points of view of the main trade 
blocks regarding these issues. In this section our attention wil l be focused 
mainly on the more political issues of the PSE as discussed by the 
Contracting Parties, like policy coverage, commodity coverage, country 
coverage, reference price, reference year, optional use etc. The discussion 
as pursued in the Technical Group wil l not be dealt wi th as this would 
lead to a reiteration of the issues analysed in chapter three. In sec-
t ion 4.4 the preliminary proposal wi th respect to the AMS as presented 
in the Dunkel paper in December 1991 wil l be analysed. Although this 
agreement was rejected by the Contracting Parties it functioned as the 
basis for the Blair House agreement between the EC and the US in 
December 1992, which is discussed in section 4.5 in relation to the AMS. 
In section 4.6 the final GATT agreement of December 1993 is described, 
wi th special attention for the modifications in the final agreement as 
compared to the Dunkel paper (also related to the AMS). Finally in 
section 4.7 some conclusions are drawn by comparing the views of the 
Contracting Parties in the GATT with the final GATT agreement. 
4.2 Optional uses of the PSE in the Uruguay Round 
4.2.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in section 4.1, the NG5 and the Technical Group rec-
ognized after intensive discussion about the AMSIPSE that it would be 
very difficult, if not impossible to f ind an AMS on the basis of which 
binding commitments could be made, as also concluded in chapter three. 
Therefore both the NG5, the Technical Group and scientists proposed 
some additional optional uses for the AMSIPSE. 
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Option I: Commitments to reduce protection and support expressed in 
terms of PSE (Ballenger, 1988; GATT, 1987a; GATT, 1988a; 
GATT, 1988d; Tangermann et al., 1987); 
Option II: The PSE as a unit of account or yardstick (GATT, 1987a; GATT, 
1988a; GATT, 1988d); 
Option III: The PSE as a monitoring device (Ballenger, 1988; GATT, 1987a; 
GATT, 1988a; GATT, 1988d; Tangermann et al., 1987); 
Option IV: The PSE as an adjunct to strengthened and more operational-
ly effective GATT rules and disciplines (GATT, 1987; GATT, 
1988d). 
These options will be described in the following subsections. 
4.2.2 Option I 
This option would involve using the PSE itself as a medium for 
expressing commitments to progressively phase down protection and 
support. This is the option for which the AMS was intended at the start 
of the Uruguay Round and which has been the basis for the discussion. 
Within this option there is spectrum of possibilities: 
a. 'pure' PSE approach; on the one end of this spectrum, PSEs could be 
made the central medium of GATT commitments and disciplines of 
agriculture (as was intended in the Uruguay Round). PSEs would 
then substitute for traditional GATT rules in agriculture. Instead of 
using rules and disciplines on the use of particular policy instru-
ments, like import restrictions or export subsidies, all commitments 
and disciplines would be defined just in terms of PSEs. The objective 
would then be to reach agreement, after multilateral agreements 
were reached on the definition of PSE measurement, on a base 
reference PSE for a given product or sector and on a transition 
period for the progressive formula (GATT, 1988d). Negotiations 
could then be held on gradual and balanced reductions of PSEs. 
(Ballenger, 1988). In this 'pure' PSE option of course also the com-
modity coverage would be subject to negotiations. The commodities 
which would not be subject to PSE commitments would then be 
subject to the existing (or modified) GATT disciplines. 
In this scenario, each participant would decide for himself how the 
annual PSE reduction would be implemented. The specific measures 
taken to reduce direct or indirect support would be notified and 
would be subject to monitoring by other participants in the agree-
ment to check that they brought about the annual reduction (GATT, 
1988d). 
The problems with this approach have already extensively been 
discussed. 
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b. PSE bindings with GATT disciplines; another possibility, instead of a 
'pure' PSE approach, is to combine PSE bindings wi th existing (or 
modified) GATT disciplines for agricultural trade (Tangermann et al., 
1987), in particular the disciplines of Articles XI and XVI (GATT, 
1969) (these articles have been cited in appendix 7). The principle 
would be that whatever is truly binding in any particular sense, the 
country concerned would have to respect the PSE binding or the 
traditional GATT discipline. For example, an exporting country 
would have to respect its PSE binding as long as its exports did not 
exceed the equitable share. However, if the country nonetheless 
were to export more than its equitable share, it would have to 
respect the equitable share discipline. The advantage of such an 
approach would be that it would seem to provide more 'security' 
and therefore reduce the problem of equal PSEs, differing trade 
distortions. 
c. PSE only for certain GATT disciplines; one further step away from 
substituting PSEs for traditional GATT disciplines would be to use 
the PSE approach for only certain GATT disciplines, while other 
issues are left to be regulated under traditional GATT rules 
(Ballenger, 1988; Tangermann et al. 1987). For example, it could be 
agreed that PSE bindings would apply only to exported commod-
ities, while imports would remain subject to traditional GATT disci-
plines. The advantage of this approach would be that some prob-
lems of the PSE concept could be avoided. For example only the real 
trade distorting measures would be included in the PSE and other 
policies would fall under additional GATT rules. The disadvantage of 
this approach is that it may imply the danger of creating imbalances 
in terms of different stringency of GATT obligations for different 
countries. 
4.2.3 Option II 
This option would involve using the PSE as a yardstick or unit of 
account to measure or assess the value of specific commitments to reduce 
protection and support (GATT, 1988d). In this option PSEs are only used 
for measuring the status quo and for defining the extent to which pol-
icies have to be adjusted, whereas commitments would then be defined 
in terms of policies rather than in terms of PSEs (GATT, 1987). After 
measuring existing PSEs, countries would have to reach agreement on 
how much PSEs should be reduced. Negotiations could then take place 
on how individual policy measures should be adjusted to affect the 
intended PSE reductions. This option would have the advantage of pro-
tecting countries from the vagaries of world price and exchange rate 
changes. A subsequent appreciation of a country's currency (external 
reference price fall) would often have the effect of increasing the PSE 
level, but would not oblige the country to make greater cuts in, say, its 
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target support prices than had been previously agreed. On the other 
hand, whether the indicated PSE reduction is considered to adequately 
reflect proposed commitments is another matter. For example, one of 
the main problems is that certain types of commitments, particularly 
those whose effects are measured jointly via the domestic/external price 
differential technique, would not be reflected automatically in a re-calcu-
lated PSE. 
4.2.4 Option III 
This option would involve using the PSE as a monitoring device, 
either as an adjunct to options I and II, or as a device for monitoring the 
general shape and direction of domestic agricultural policies (GATT, 
1988d). Obligations and commitments would continue to be defined in 
terms of existing or modified GATT rules and disciplines. PSEs would be 
used only as a starting point and as an information base for traditional 
negotiations and as a way of monitoring progress in achieving the nego-
t iat ing objectives. In this option there would be no intrinsic connection 
between the base reference PSE and the PSE for a subsequent year 
unless certain parameters remain constant, as the PSE for a more remote 
year would reflect the particular price and other relevant economic con-
ditions prevailing in that year. 
4.2.5 Option IV 
The general objective under this option would be to give greater 
precision and authority to the GATT rules and disciplines, particularly 
under Articles XI and XVI (see appendix 7) (GATT, 1987a; GATT, 1988d). 
The essence of an effective reinforcement of the Article Xl:2(c) disciplines 
relating to effective limitation of production and access would be to 
extend the explicit coverage of the Article. It should include all non-tariff 
access restrictions, possibly as well as such high tariffs that discourage the 
importation of even minimum quantities, and to spell out in concrete 
terms the extent of contracting parties' obligations under the minimum 
access provisions of Article Xl:2(c). Under such an approach a general 
monitoring role could be envisaged for the PSE in the context of the 
transitional arrangements under which contracting parties would bring 
their existing measures into line wi th reinforced disciplines relating to 
effective control of production and access. Such a role would however 
not be essential in the context of access. 
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4.3 AMS discussion by the Contracting Parties in the Uruguay Round 
4.3.1 Issues raised by NG5 
The discussion on the AMS and the PSE in particular by the Con-
tracting Parties of the GATT was launched in September 1987 by a note 
of the NG5 group which was intended to serve as a basis for intensive 
examination (GATT, 1987a). 
In this note the following issues are raised which had to be dealt 
with by the Contracting Parties when the AMS would be used in the 
negotiations: 
1. Optional use. What will be the role of the AMS, Option I, II, III or IV 
(as described in the previous section)?; 
2. Policy coverage. Which policies should be included? Should all pol-
icies, only the trade distorting policies or another group of policies 
be included?; 
3. Product coverage. Which products should be included? 
Should the AMS be calculated for all products, only for products of 
which data are available or only the products that distort trade 
most?; 
4. Country coverage. Should the number of countries covered be as 
large as possible in order to cover a substantial part of production 
and trade of the product concerned or should only a selected group 
of countries be covered?; 
5. Reference or base period. Which reference year or period should be 
chosen as the starting point in the negotiations?. Should this be a 
common reference period, with the risk of not reflecting the most 
actual support policies or a reference period which differs per coun-
try, but which reflects the most recent situation of the countries 
concerned?; 
6. Reference price. Which reference price should be used, a moving 
average of several years, a fixed reference price or something else?; 
7. Monetary fluctuations. Exchange rate and world price fluctuations 
are exogenous factors, which influence the AMS of a country with-
out having changed policies. How should this problem be dealt 
with?; 
8. Supply control. It is stated that the effect of domestic supply control 
policies on world trade is underestimated in the AMS. The question 
is therefore if credit should be given to countries applying domestic 
supply control policies? 
After September 1987 delegations have been asked several times to 
submit papers on the AMS. In the next section the views expressed by 
the Contracting Parties on the issues put forward in the GATT (1987a) are 
summarized. 
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4.3.2 Views on AMS issues expressed by the Contracting Parties 
In the fol lowing subsections the points of view on the various issues 
wi th respect to the AMS wil l be discussed. To improve the comprehensi-
bility and clearness, I tried to unravel the various views of the Contract-
ing Parties in order to present them per issue as was done in the previ-
ous section. 
4.3.2.1 Optional use 
The US regards an AMS as a tool to monitor which should not take 
a more substantial role (Commission of the European Communities, 
1988b). In another document of September 1988 (GATT, 1988i) they state 
that the monitoring role of the PSE must involve the tracking of specific 
policy commitments undertaken by countries (option III). They state that 
probably a family of aggregate measures drawing from the same data 
base might be considered for this purpose. They are not in favour of 
option I as the Technical Group has proved that the AMS cannot reveal 
which market price support is provided by which policies. Commitments 
must therefore be defined in terms of specific policies, which is option II. 
The US, when talking about the AMS, is in fact referring to the PSE as 
they use the PSE concept of the OECD as a reference point (GATT, 1987d; 
GATT, 1988i). 
The EC is in favour of option I and III, however only when the Sup-
port Measurement Unit (SMU) is used as AMS. The SMU, as introduced 
and proposed by the EC, is a derivative of the PSE concept. The principal 
difference between the SMU and the PSE is that the external reference 
price, which fluctuates in the PSE, remains fixed in the SMU. By doing so, 
one makes sure that changes in the SMU are only due to modification of 
support policies (Commission of the European Communities, 1988f; GATT, 
1988c). 
Canada is in favour of using options II and III, which means the 
'target' and the monitoring option. They are not in favour of option I 
because they think that the key role played by external reference prices, 
f luctuating world prices etc in the calculation of the AMS, could pose a 
serious problem. AMS levels would have to be regularly recalculated in 
order to verify if commitments are met (GATT, 1988a). 
The Cairns Group puts forward the same opinion and reasoning as 
Canada does and therefore also proposes options II and III. According to 
the Cairns Group option I is not relevant as the AMS as such cannot be 
an instrument to reduce support in agriculture. It would only be possible 
to make commitments on the basis of an AMS when the policy measures 
included would be valued on the basis of their trade distorting effect. 
This would mean that for example export subsidies would be given a 
high negative coefficient, while 'decoupled measures', like research and 
extension, would be given a credit. Such a 'perfect' AMS would also have 
to take domestic supply control policies, food security measures, regional 
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development measures etc into account. As this is impossible they con-
sider option I as irrelevant (GATT, 19881). 
4.3.2.2 Policy coverage 
The US wants the AMS to cover all subsidies and other measures 
that directly or indirectly have an impact on agricultural trade. Therefore 
all direct payments related to production, those payments that provide a 
safety net against natural disasters and other extraordinary circumstances 
(decoupled payments) and the bona fide foreign and domestic food aid 
are excluded from the negotiation. The US focuses special attention on 
distinguishing 'decoupled policies' (GATT, 1988i). 
The EC states that only measures with a significant incidence on 
trade should be taken into consideration (GATT, 1988c). They add that 
the initial policy coverage must be as large as possible in the discussions, 
in order not to forget anything, until decisions have been taken on what 
policies should be included or left out. However the EC proposes that 
policies which will be excluded from the AMS still have to be measured 
by a kind of surveillance system (GATT, 1988k). 
Though Canada is a member of the Cairns Group, whose proposal 
they subscribe, they also have their own proposal. Canada proposed 
another AMS, which can again be regarded as a derivative of the PSE 
concept and is called the Trade Distortion Equivalent (TDE) (GATT, 
1988a). The idea in fact is to modify the PSE to the extent that it will 
better indicate trade distortions, which, as has been shown in chapter 
three, is one of the main problems of the PSE as an AMS in trade negoti-
ations. As also shown in chapter three, in the TDE approach all agricul-
tural programmes will be classified into three groups, namely the non-
distorting, the partially-distorting and the fully-distorting group. The 
precise classification is given in appendix 6. The first group will be com-
pletely omitted from the TDE calculation, as they are not trade-distort-
ing. The third group will be wholly included and will therefore be the 
same as in the PSF. However for the second group, the partially-distort-
ing one (supply quotas, stabilization schemes etc), corrections will be 
made in order to give countries that apply those measures some credit. 
The Cairns Group proposed to use an AMS, expressed as an aggre-
gate monetary value and based on support measures that have an inci-
dence on the production level. This kind of AMS is called the 'Aggregate 
Monetary Level of Output-Based Support' (AMLOBS) The Output-Based 
Aggregate Measure is also a derivative of the PSE (GATT, 19881). They 
state that all trade-distorting support measures which affect production 
and undermine the functioning of market prices, can be defined as trans-
fers to the benefit of producers and should be included in the AMLOBS. 
These transfers include the policies resulting in the difference between 
domestic production prices and world market prices, all budgetary trans-
fers related to producer incentives and exclude fiscal concessions and 
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support measures which can be categorized in the group of general ser-
vices (GATT, 19881). 
4.3.2.3 Product coverage 
The US favours as broad a commodity coverage as practically and 
technically possible (GATT, 1987d). The US is not in favour of including 
processed products into AMS calculations, as the support they receive is 
less pervasive than for raw, bulk commodities. Besides, this support is 
often tied to support of basic commodities and is therefore reflected in 
the AMS of those basic products. If support to basic commodities is effec-
tively dealt with through the Uruguay Round negotiations, a simpler, 
more direct, rules-based treatment for processed products is proposed by 
the US (GATT, 1987d; GATT, 1988i). 
The EC states that the product coverage depends on the way in 
which negotiations are conducted. As long as the negotiations are con-
centrated on major products, the products chosen by the OECD (1987) 
are considered to be sufficient. This in fact applies to the short term. For 
the long run, they state, it might be appropriate to determine SMUs for 
other products (GATT, 1988c; GATT, 1988k). 
Canada thinks that the more appropriate quantitative indicators like 
the TDE are, the more homogeneous the traded commodity will be. 
Including all types and qualities of products, which all require a separate 
TDE calculation, would increase the logistical burden. Therefore Canada 
proposes, at least during the first round of its use in the context of the 
GATT, to restrict the application of the TDE to a limited range of the 
more important and more homogeneous traded commodities. The calcu-
lation could be confined to the earliest stage of processing at which 
substantial trade first occurs. For the long run the product coverage must 
be as wide as possible (GATT, 1988a). 
The Cairns Group is in favour of the product coverage being as wide 
as possible, even if for practical reasons the AMS will in the short run be 
restricted to the most trade-distorting products. The Cairns Group there-
fore proposes that for early action products will be covered of which the 
AMLOBS is greater than 10% (GATT, 19881). 
4.3.2.4 Country coverage 
Concerning the country coverage the US is in favour of the point of 
view of the GATT secretariat, namely 'that a comprehensive collection of 
data covering as many countries as possible is desirable to assist further 
consideration of both technical and policy issues' (GATT, 1987d). 
The EC is also in favour of having a country coverage as large as 
possible, namely in order to cover a substantial proportion of the produc-
tion and trade of a given product (GATT, 1988c). 
Canada states that there is considerable evidence for a large propor-
tion of total world price distortion being contributed by the support 
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policies of a relatively small number of major producers and traders. 
Therefore Canada proposes that first those countries will be covered that 
distort world trade most, to be extended later on with other countries 
(GATT, 1988a). 
The Cairns Group agrees with Canada to restrict the number of 
countries covered to the most trade-distorting ones for the short run due 
to the logistical problems of a larger country coverage. They state how-
ever that in the long run the country coverage must be as wide as possi-
ble (GATT, 19881). 
4.3.2.5 Reference year or base period 
The US states that in general, support must be dealt with in a man-
ner that reflects current conditions as closely as possible, which means 
the most recent period possible for which data are available (GATT, 
1987d). 
Also Canada and the Cairns Group are in favour of the most recent 
reference year of which data are available. According to the Cairns 
Group this means that the year 1988 is most suitable (GATT, 19881). 
Canada adds that the chosen reference year must also meet the criterion 
that it can be applied equally to each country and each commodity 
(GATT, 1988a). 
The EC states that the year 1984 should be taken for both the short 
and the long run (GATT, 1988k). However this reference year has been 
proposed by the EC under the SMU approach, but not under the PSE 
approach (Commission of the European Communities, 1988f; GATT, 
1988e). Figure 1 in appendix 8 (figure based on data of the Commission 
of the European Communities, 1988f) shows why. The figure learns that 
the PSE increases considerably until 1987 in spite of the CAP reform. This 
is mainly due to the fact that the world market prices were rather high 
in 1984 because of the high value of the US $. From 1987 onwards, the 
PSE shrinks because the world market prices increase and the internal 
CAP prices continue to decrease. Therefore under the PSE approach the 
year 1987 would be most suitable as a reference year from the 
Community's point of view (which is however only valid if the present 
favourable world market situation prevails over further years). The best 
base year under the SMU approach would evidently be the one in which 
the Community started with its substantial changes in the CAP, namely 
1984. A more recent base year would still measure the positive effects of 
the CAP, but would imply that credits for earlier efforts would be given 
away. The Community also states that the PSE concept in no way would 
allow commitments on basis of the year 1984 (Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities, 1988c). The same effect is shown in table 1 and 2 in 
appendix 8 (Commission of the European Communities, 1988e). Price 
reductions or increases (presented as negative reductions) are shown for 
milk, sugar beet and beef, necessary to achieve a reduction of support of 
10, 15 or 20%, measured in Total SMU or Total PSE when three different 
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base years are chosen. The conclusions which can be drawn from these 
tables suggest the same as figure 1. 
4.3.2.6 Reference price 
The US proposes to adopt the OECD methodology on reference 
prices which, in general, involves the use of observed border prices. The 
US is not in favour of fixed external reference prices as changes in sup-
port brought about through border measures will not be directly or fully 
reflected and will therefore not reveal the actual support situation 
(GATT, 1987d). 
In contrast with the US, which rejects it, the EC proposes a fixed 
external reference price (the characteristic feature of the SMU), which is 
therefore not vulnerable in respect of exogenous factors. Another advan-
tage according to the EC is that Contracting Parties know exactly what 
are the contents of their commitments (GATT, 1988c; GATT, 1988k). 
The fixed external reference price that the EC proposes should be 
the lowest external reference price, as calculated by the OECD for the 
period 1979-1987 and will be selected per country and per commodity 
and expressed in the country's own currency. 
In a document of the Commission of the European Communities 
(1988c) the political importance of this issue for the EC in the negoti-
ations was clearly put forward. It was stated that for the CAP (Common 
Agricultural Policy) the major element in the PSE is reflected in the dif-
ference between the world market price (= external reference price) and 
the internal market price. The SMU approach with its fixed external ref-
erence price would therefore better capture the effects of the CAP 
reform and would lead to a steadily decreasing figure (Commission of 
the European Communities, 1988c). 
Canada proposes to use the most recently available estimates of 
commodity prices as external reference price in the TDE calculations 
(GATT, 1988a). Canada is also in favour of c.i.fVf.o.b. smoothing with 
respect to the difference in external reference price for an importing and 
an exporting country. As explained in chapter three this would be to 
calculate a TDE on production up to domestic requirements based on the 
higher (import) external reference price, and a different TDE on any 
production in excess of domestic requirements based on the lower 
(export) external reference price (GATT, 1988a). 
The Cairns Group follows, just like the US, the OECD methodology. 
This means that the reference prices are proposed to be established per 
country and per product and to be derived from the price of another 
product, with which the first one has to compete (GATT, 19881). 
4.3.2.7 Monetary fluctuations 
According to the US, exchange rates are an integral part of the 
international economic environment within which agricultural trade 
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takes place. Therefore they propose to use the OECD methodology, 
which involves no correction for exchange rates. However a 'smoothing' 
of the effects of exchange rate movements by taking an average of 
recent exchange rates is not excluded by the US (GATT, 1987d). 
The EC proposes to solve this problem by taking fixed external ref-
erence prices in the SMU, as mentioned earlier (GATT, 1988k). The EC 
also mentions the problem of inflation and states that it could be appro-
priate to adjust commitments by a deflator (GATT, 1988c). 
Canada proposes a possible moving average of exchange rates in 
order to abandon fluctuations. Another possibility they put forward is to 
devise a mechanism by which TDE commitments of individual countries 
would be automatically adjusted in line with changes in each country's 
trade-weighted exchange rate (GATT, 1988a). 
As wi th the external reference prices, the Cairns Group follows wi th 
respect to this issue the methodology of the OECD (which involves no 
correction), or a possible moving average of exchange rates (for example 
of the three most recent years) (GATT, 19881). 
4.3.2.8 Supply control 
The US is of the opinion that no 'credit' should be given to coun-
tries applying domestic supply control policies. According to the US these 
measures are adequately reflected in the Total PSE. They state that 'all 
countries take actions from time to time that at least marginally improve 
(or worsen) the trading environment for others' (GATT, 1987d). 
The EC is in favour of modifying the SMU in order to be able to 
give credits to countries that effectively apply supply control measures 
(GATT, 1988c). The EC therefore launches two possible solutions (GATT, 
1988c). 
1. use the Total SMU. This total amount will be reduced in proportion 
to the reduction of the production. However this method does not 
allow for an 'extra credit', but just takes the production effect into 
account, which wil l not happen when a Percent SMU is used; 
2. more accurate methods, like simulating a future production, if the 
production quota had not been introduced, and the reduction in 
producer prices which would have been necessary to ensure a pro-
duction level equal to that introduced by quantitative restrictions. 
Despite these possible solutions, the EC states that it must be con-
sidered case-by-case whether a country should be given a credit. 
Canada is in favour of giving credits to countries applying various 
supply control policies and proposes some mathematical corrections 
(GATT, 1988a). A few of these approaches have been explained in the 
previous chapter in section 3.3.1.4 in which supply control policies have 
been dealt wi th. However as Canada recognized that these corrections 
require information, like supply and demand elasticities which are not 
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always available, they propose to use a more pragmatic approach in the 
negotiations, which means that negotiated credits should be given to 
countries applying supply control policies at world market price levels 
(GATT, 1988a). 
The Cairns Group is of the opinion that supply control policies are 
already taken into account by the PSE (and in the AMLOBS, as proposed 
by the Cairns Group) when it is expressed as an aggregate monetary 
value. Besides they state that the surpluses of the products, to which 
those supply control policies are applied, have arisen from internal sup-
port policies and that there is no need for extra credit (GATT, 19881). 
4.3.2.9 Synopsis of views on various AMS issues 
In the previous sections the proposals or points of view on the most 
important issues with respect to the AMS haven been given of four 
major trade blocks in the GATT negotiations. In appendix 9 the main 
points are summarized. For information this overview is extended with 
the points of view of Jamaica and the Nordic countries 1), which have 
however not been dealt wi th in separate sections. The information in 
this overview is based on the information from the previous sections, and 
two additional GATT documents (GATT, 1988b; GATT, 1988h). From this 
overview one could draw some conclusions on the points of view as 
expressed by the Contracting Parties. 
First of all, apart from the EC all Contracting Parties are in favour of 
option II for the use of an AMS in negotiations. Jamaica and the EC are 
the only ones in favour of option I. 
With respect to policy coverage, there seems to be agreement, in 
that all Contracting Parties focus on inclusion of the trade-distorting 
measures. However except from Canada no Contracting Party really 
defines which policies can be regarded as trade-distorting. 
Concerning product coverage there is more or less agreement about 
first starting with surplus products because those are most trade distort-
ing. For the long run the product coverage can be extended. 
The opinions concerning country coverage also seem to lead to 
agreement. The general opinion is to take a country coverage as wide as 
possible for the long run, but to take the practical problems into account 
for the short run. This means that for the short run countries should be 
covered that distort trade most. 
The choice of the reference year varies considerably among the 
Contracting Parties. From the overview can be concluded that this is a 
political point and therefore very touchy. The EC proposes 1984/85 as 
reference year combined with the use of the SMU. This base year will 
take best into account the agricultural reforms since 1984. However the 
1) The choice of especially these countries is arbitrary and based on the fact 
that these were the only countries of which information was available. 
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Cairns Group (including Canada) as a major agricultural exporter is in 
favour of using the most recent base period. 
For the external reference price, the same can be stated as wi th the 
reference year. While some Contracting Parties, like Canada and the US 
are in favour of using reference prices reflecting the market reality best, 
the EC is in favour of fixed external reference prices (the lowest of the 
period 1979-87) in that those prices do best take account of the CAP 
reform (see appendix 8). 
The problem of fluctuating exchange rates is, according to most 
Contracting Parties, to be solved by a moving average of the two or 
three most recent years. Only the EC solves the problem by using a fixed 
external reference price for the same reason as mentioned in the previ-
ous paragraph. 
With respect to supply control policies the EC and Canada are in 
favour of correcting the AMS wi th a credit. The other Contracting Parties 
are of the opinion that supply control policies are already accurately 
measured by the AMS and that there is no need for extra credit. 
As can be seen from the above conclusions, very few AMS questions 
are purely technical. As is also stated in a document of the Technical 
Working Group, 'the choice of variant of the aggregate measure is 
bound up wi th the aims for its use, and this is a political question which 
concerns the form of the negotiations as a whole' (GATT, 1988g). 
The above points of view with respect to the various issues of the 
AMS have already been expressed by the Contracting Parties before the 
Mid-Term Review in April 1989. At the Mid-Term Review itself an import-
ant decision was taken, namely the acknowledgement that credits for 
actions taken since the beginning of the Round would be taken into 
account. The EC therefore revised its proposal wi th regards to the AMS in 
July 1989 on the issue of the base or reference year chosen and stated 
that due to this decision at the Mid-Term Review they were in favour of 
taking as a reference period the average of the years 1984, 1985 and 
1986 (GATT, 1989). 
Since the Mid-Term-Review Agreement in April 1989, apart from the 
EC, no real modifications have taken place in the proposals on the AMS 
of the different Contracting Parties as they were tabled at the Mid-Term-
Review. Therefore, when in March 1991 Arthur Dunkel, the secretary-
general of the GATT, suggested a checklist of issues for the consultations 
on agriculture, still the same issues were tabled and there still was no 
solution (GATT, 1991a). 
In his checklist Dunkel distinguished five main areas of issues (GATT, 
1991a). 
1. policy coverage; 
2. definit ion of an AMS; 
3. the definition of equivalent commitments, where it is not possible 
to calculate an AMS; 
68 
4. the relationship between commitments and inflation; 
5. the reinforcement of GATT rules and disciplines. 
For each area Dunkel listed a range of questions to be checked by 
the Contracting Parties, which should be dealt with in the final GATT 
agreement. The questions posed in the checklist give a fairly good over-
view of the issues with respect to the AMS which were still being dis-
cussed at that moment. Therefore the most important questions of each 
area mentioned in the paper will be briefly summarized. 
Sub1: The main question concerning policy coverage is still which pol-
icies should be exempt from reduction (the 'green' policies) and 
which policies should be subject to reduction (the 'amber' pol-
icies). The 'amber' policies would be regarded as trade-distorting. 
The second important question referred to by Dunkel is how the 
distinction between those two groups should be made. Dunkel 
mentions therefore three alternatives to consider. 
a. descriptive lists of policies in particular categories; 
b. criteria for assigning policies into a particular category; 
c. a combination of the above approaches. 
Sub2: Out of the checklist can be concluded that at that point in time 
(April 1991) there was still no agreement about the definition of 
the AMS and the choice of the base year. Dunkel considers those 
questions as 'largely political' and states that they have to be 
solved by the Contracting Parties in the time period left. 
Sub3: The next problem is what form of equivalent commitments 
should be made, where it is impossible to calculate an AMS. 
Especially the question of how such commitments could be com-
pared to AMS commitments is a main issue. 
Sub4: Concerning the relationship between commitments and inflation, 
Dunkel considers as the most important questions c.q points 
whether there should be a correction for inflation or not and if 
there will be one, how it will be done. 
Sub5: The final area Dunkel refers to is the reinforcement of GATT rules 
and disciplines. He focuses especially on the question what the 
relationship should be between the AMS as used in the reform 
programme and the reinforced GATT rules and disciplines, in 
particular the second sentence of Article XVI: 1 (see appendix 7). 
All the questions/problems were submitted by Arthur Dunkel to all 
Contracting Parties once again in order to give them an overview of 
issues that must be solved with respect to the AMS before the end of 
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1991, which was the intended year to come up with a GATT Agreement 
for the Uruguay Round. Whether real agreement was reached by the 
Contracting Parties on all the issues mentioned in the period that was 
left is not known, however in December 1991 a compromise proposal, 
called the Dunkel paper, (GATT, 1991b), was presented by the secretary-
general to all Contracting Parties. The preliminary points of view in this 
paper with respect to the AMS and its related issues (as mentioned 
above) will be analysed in the next section. 
4.4 The Dunkel paper 
4.4.1 Introduction 
The Dunkel paper (GATT, 1991b) was a compromise proposal indi-
cating how the targets as agreed upon at the start of the Round in 1986 
could be realized. The Agricultural Part of the paper therefore described, 
among other things, how the targets: 
1. improvement of market access; 
2. internal support reduction; and 
3. improvement of export competition, 
could be realized for agriculture. 
What is especially interesting for the underlying study in this 
respect, is the way the AMS is dealt with in the Dunkel paper. From the 
Dunkel paper can be derived that the AMS will be used as a basis for 
commitments in the area of internal support reduction and the monitor-
ing thereafter. These are in fact the options I and III as defined earlier, 
however utilized only for part of the total support. The commitments for 
the other two areas, market access and export competition, have been 
established by rules defined by the traditional offer and request method. 
In order to get a good overview of the function of the AMS as pro-
posed in the Dunkel paper, the next section will start with the definition 
of the AMS as defined in the Dunkel paper. In section 4.4.3 the areas of 
market access and export competition, which are excluded from the AMS 
will be briefly discussed. In section 4.4.4 finally, the internal support area 
on which the AMS will be applied, will be discussed. 
4.4.2 Definition of the AMS 
The Dunkel paper provides no clear definition of the AMS but 
describes it in its various elements. In the Dunkel paper (GATT, 1991b) is 
stated that an AMS 'shall be calculated on a product-specific basis for 
each basic product (defined as the product as close as practicable to the 
first point of sale) receiving market price support, non-exempt direct 
payments, or any other subsidy not exempted from the reduction com-
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mitment (...)'• Support which is non-product specific shall be totalled into 
one non-product-specific AMS and will also be expressed in total monet-
ary terms. Further on a specific AMS shall be established for each basic 
product, expressed in total monetary terms. 
The market price support shall be calculated using the gap between 
a fixed external reference price and the applied administered price multi-
plied by the quantity of production eligible to receive the applied admin-
istered price. Budgetary expenditures made to maintain this gap, such as 
buying-in or storage costs shall not be included in the AMS. 
The external reference price used in measuring the price gap wil l be 
fixed on the basis of the average of the period 1986-1988 and wil l in 
general be the average f.o.b. price of the product for a net exporter and 
the average c.i.f. price for a net importer in the period considered. The 
used reference price can be adapted, as necessary and desired, in order 
to take quality differences into account. All the prices used will be in real 
terms, although it is not mentioned which deflator will be used. 
The non-exempt direct payments will be measured either by the 
earlier mentioned price gap or by using budgetary outlays. 
The internal support given to agricultural processors wil l be 
included to the extent that this support is also to the benefit of the pro-
ducer of the base product. 
Finally the Dunkel paper mentions that for all products where mar-
ket price support exists, but for which calculation of this component of 
the AMS is not practicable, equivalent measurements of support wil l be 
calculated. Those equivalent measurements of market price support shall 
be made using the applied administered price and the quantity of pro-
duction eligible to receive that price or, where this is not practicable, on 
budgetary outlays used to maintain the producer price. 
4.4.3 Market access and export competition 
The improvement of market access and export competition are pro-
posed in the Dunkel paper to be kept out of AMS calculations and to be 
realized by commitments on the basis of rules. In summary these commit-
ments involve that: 
1. for agricultural products currently subject to ordinary customs duties 
only, these duties will be bound on the level as agreed upon in the 
negotiations and reduced on average with 36% for the period 1993-
1999, wi th a minimum of 15% for each tariff line; 
2. for agricultural products subject to border measures other than 
ordinary customs duties, these measures will be conversed to 
'tariff ication'. This means that for those measures an equivalent ad 
valorem tariff wil l be calculated which will thereafter be subject to 
the same reduction commitments as the ordinary customs duties are. 
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The most important policies that are intended to be subject to this 
tariffication and therefore to be excluded from the AMS involve among 
others: 
1. quantitative import restrictions; 
2. variable import levies; 
3. minimum import prices; 
4. discretionary import licensing; 
5. non-tariff measures maintained through state trading enterprises; 
and, 
6. voluntary export restraints. 
Moreover some rules have been defined for the establishment of 
minimum access opportunities in cases where there are no significant 
imports. These minimum access opportunities perform as an extra guar-
antee for the improvement of market access on top of the above defined 
reductions in tariffs. 
The commitments for the export area involve a reduction of both 
export subsidies and export quantities with respectively 36% and 24% 
during the period 1993-1999 based on the period 1986-1990. The policies 
envisaged in the term 'export subsidies' and which are therefore exclu-
ded from the AMS calculations are the following. 
1. the provision by governments or their agencies of direct subsidies to 
a firm, to producers of an agricultural product, etc, contingent on 
export performance; 
2. the sale or disposal by governments or their agencies of non-com-
mercial stocks of agricultural products at a price lower than the 
comparable price for buyers in the domestic market; 
3. payments on the export of an agricultural product that are financed 
by virtue of governmental action, whether financed by the public 
account or by the proceeds of a levy imposed on the agricultural 
product concerned or on an agricultural product from which the 
exported product is derived; 
4. subsidies adjudged in order to reduce costs of marketing exports of 
agricultural products; 
5. internal transport and freight charges on export shipments, pro-
vided or mandated by governments, on more favourable terms than 
for domestic shipments; 
6. subsidies on agricultural products contingent on their incorporation 
in exported products. 
4.4.4 Internal support 
The area of internal support is the only area for which commitments 
are agreed upon on the basis of the AMS, as defined in section 4.4.2. The 
Dunkel paper envisages a reduction of all domestic support in favour of 
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agricultural producers, by 20% during the period from 1993 till 1999, 
taking as the reference period 1986 till 1988. This reduction commitment 
was proposed to be expressed and implemented through an AMS for 
each individual product, or through equivalent commitments where the 
calculation of an AMS is not practicable. The equivalent commitments 
will be calculated by taking the administered price and the production 
quantity, or if not available, the budgetary expenditures used for main-
taining the support level. 
With respect to the policy coverage of the AMS, one of the main 
issues in the negotiations, the Dunkel paper states that all internal sup-
port policies should be included except those that have no or a negli-
gible trade distorting effect. This was also put forward by the Contract-
ing Parties. The problem however is how to distinguish between policies. 
The Dunkel paper proposes to make the distinction on the basis of objec-
tive criteria. The paper puts forward two general criteria and specific 
criteria per policy measure. Policies must meet both the general criteria 
and their own specific criteria. The policies that meet the criteria will be 
excluded from the reduction programme, others will be included. Newly 
introduced policies, for which no specific criteria are mentioned, will be 
checked on the two general criteria. These two general criteria are: 
1. the support in question shall be provided through a publicly-funded 
government programme not involving transfers from consumers; 
and; 
2. the support in question shall not have the effect of providing price 
support to producers. 
The measures for which specific criteria have been established are: 
1. Government Service Programmes: 
- research, training, and extension and advisory; 
- pest and disease control; 
- inspection; 
- marketing and promotion, excluding expenditure for unspecified 
purposes that could be used by sellers to reduce their selling price 
or confer a direct economic benefit to purchasers; 
- infrastructural services; 
2. Public stockholding for food security purposes; 
3. Domestic food aid. 
The policies mentioned in the following under points four to nine 
all include programmes providing direct payments to producers. 
4. Decoupled income support. The Dunkel paper gives five criteria, 
that a support measure must meet in order to be regarded as 
decoupled: 
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- eligibility for such payments shall be determined by clearly 
defined criteria such as income, status as a producer or land-
owner, etc; 
- the amount of such payments in any given year shall not be 
related, or based on, the type of volume or production (including 
livestock units) undertaken by the producer in any year after the 
base period; 
- the amount of such payments in any given year shall not be 
related to, or based on, the prices, domestic or international, 
applying to any production undertaken in any year after the base 
period; 
- the amount of such payments in any given year shall not be 
related to, or based on, the factors of production employed in 
any year after the base period; 
- no production shall be required in order to receive such pay-
ments; 
5. Government financial participation in income insurance and income 
safety-net programmes; 
6. Disaster payments; 
7. Structural adjustment assistance provided through: 
a. producer retirement programmes; 
b. resources retirement programmes; 
c. investment aids; 
8. Payments under environmental programmes; 
9. Payments under regional assistance programmes. 
The different programmes mentioned above are all subject to dif-
ferent criteria, which wil l however not all be mentioned here. Only one 
criterion wil l be mentioned, as this is commonly proposed for all direct 
payments. This criterion involves that the payments may not be related 
to the type of production, the production level (included payments 
granted per animal), internal or international prices and production fac-
tors. When the above programmes meet the two general criteria and 
their specific criteria, they will be exempted from the AMS. 
However, the Dunkel paper gives one other opportunity for policies 
to be exempted from the internal support reduction programme. Namely 
product-specific domestic support which would normally be required to 
be included, is allowed to be exempted, when it does not exceed 5% of 
the total value of production of a basic product. Domestic support that is 
not product-specific is not required to be included where such support 
does not exceed 5% of the value of total agricultural production. 
4.5 The Blair House agreement 
Although the Dunkel paper was not accepted by the Contracting 
Parties, it would be the basis for the 'Blair House' agreement in Novem-
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ber 1992 between the US and the EC (Silvis, 1994 forthcoming). This 
bilateral agreement contained special terms about grain substitutes and 
oilseeds. Furthermore it contained agreements about market access, 
export subsidies, and internal support. With respect to the latter, the EC 
and the US agreed, upon a general reduction of the AMS over all prod-
ucts of 20% for the period 1994 - 2000 1). Thus the EC and the US 
assigned a different role to the AMS than was done in the Dunkel paper. 
The Dunkel paper proposed to apply the commitment of a 20% reduc-
t ion on the AMS for each product individually. This proposal would 
impede the Contracting Parties to a large extent as to decide how the 
Total AMS reduction over all products together would be realized. There-
fore the EC and the US rejected the use of the AMS as proposed by 
Dunkel. The general reduction of the AMS over all products together as 
agreed in the Blair House agreement by the EC and the US, gives coun-
tries more flexibility in reaching their commitments. A general reduction 
of the AMS over all products allows to meet the AMS commitment by 
reducing the AMS of one specific product wi th more than 20% while 
leaving the AMS of other products unchanged. 
Furthermore, the EC and the US agreed that the internal support 
measures that were to be exempted from the AMS would not have to be 
reduced. Moreover the direct income support (per hectare and per ani-
mal) implemented in the view of the EC Common Agricultural Policy, 
would be exempted from internal support reduction. 
4.6 The final GATT agreement 
4.6.1 Introduction 
When the two most important trading partners of the GATT had 
reached bilateral consensus about a few critical issues and had laid it 
down in the Blair House agreement in November 1992, the negotiations 
wi th the other Contracting Parties could start again in order to reach a 
final GATT agreement and to end the Uruguay Round. This final agree-
ment was reached in December 1993. In this section wil l be analysed in 
what respect the final agreement differs as compared to the Dunkel 
paper, while special emphasis will be put on the use of the AMS. In sub-
section 4.6.2 the changes in the definition of the AMS wi l l be discussed. 
In subsection 4.6.3 modifications in the area of market access and export 
competition wil l be analysed, while finally in subsection 4.6.4 the 
changes in the internal support area wil l be discussed. 
1) In the Dunkel paper the implementation period was defined to be 1993 -
1999. However due to the rejection of the Dunkel paper and the conse-
quent delayed final agreement, also the implementation period was sho-
ved forward to 1994 - 2000. 
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4.6.2 Definition of the AMS 
In contrast with the Dunkel paper, in the final GATT agreement a 
definition is given of the AMS, namely as (GATT, 1993a, pp. 2): 
'the annual level of support expressed in monetary terms, provided 
for an agricultural product in favour of the producers of the basic 
agricultural product or non-product-specific support provided in 
favour of agricultural producers in general, other than support pro-
vided under programmes that qualify as exempt from reduction (...)' 
The description of the AMS concerning its calculation has not been 
modified as compared to the Dunkel paper. What has changed however 
is that a few additional definitions are presented in the final agreement. 
First of all the Total AMS is introduced and described as the sum of all 
domestic support provided in favour of agricultural producers, calculated 
as the sum of all aggregate measurements of support for basic agricul-
tural products, all non-product-specific aggregate measurements of sup-
port and all equivalent measurements of support for agricultural prod-
ucts (GATT, 1993a, pp. 3). This Total AMS is further split out in a Total 
AMS for support provided during the base period (Base Total AMS), a 
Total AMS indicating the maximum support permitted to be provided 
during any year of the implementation period or thereafter (Annual and 
Final Bound Commitment Levels) and a Total AMS indicating the level of 
support actually provided during any year of the implementation period 
and thereafter (Current Total AMS). The reason for the introduction of 
these new terms is the switch from a reduction commitment for internal 
support for the AMS of each individual product to a general reduction 
commitment for the Total AMS for all agricultural products together, 
which was arranged in the Blair House agreement. As we will see later in 
the subsection dealing with the internal support area, this modified use 
of the AMS has been adopted in the final GATT agreement from the 
Blair House agreement. 
4.6.3 Market access and export competition 
In the area of market access, the reduction commitment of 36% of 
both ordinary customs duties and the border measures converted to 
tariffication which were already proposed in the Dunkel paper, have not 
altered in the final GATT agreement. Only the reduction period has 
changed, due to the delay in reaching the final agreement. The reduc-
tion is now agreed to be realized over a six-year period, commencing in 
the year 1995 (GATT, 1993b). 
A modification, which has been made in the final GATT agreement 
deals with the measures subject to tariffication. Both in the Dunkel paper 
and in the final agreement it was stated that members should not resort 
to, or revert to measures of the kind which have been required to be 
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converted into ordinary customs duties (GATT, 1993a, pp. 4). However in 
the final agreement exemptions to this rule are accepted and the condi-
tions which have to be complied with in order to get this 'special treat-
ment' have been clearly described (see GATT, 1993a, pp. 23-25). 
With respect to the area of export competition one major change 
has been made in the final agreement as compared to the Dunkel paper. 
While it was proposed in the Dunkel paper to reduce the quantities of 
each specified agricultural product or group of products with 24%, this 
reduction commitment has been decreased to 21% in the final agree-
ment. Moreover additional commitments are made in the latter, both for 
reducing export subsidies and export quantities, with respect to the 
annual instalments of the reductions. Eventually the final agreement also 
provides possibilities to member countries to provide export subsidies in 
excess of the corresponding annual commitments in the second through 
fifth year. The conditions for these possibilities are consequently clearly 
described (GATT, 1993a, pp. 9). 
4.6.4 Internal support 
Just as proposed in the Dunkel paper, in the final agreement, the 
internal support area is the only area where the reduction commitments 
take place on the basis of the AMS. However as mentioned earlier, the 
use of the AMS has changed. Reductions commitments will not apply on 
the AMS of each individual product as proposed in the Dunkel paper. In 
the final agreement a Total AMS shall be calculated as the sum of the 
value of all Aggregate Measurements of Support and Equivalent 
Measurements of Support. The Total AMS will consequently be reduced 
during the period of implementation in equal annual instalments and 
will be bound, at the end of the period, at a level 20% below the base 
period level. The total internal support in the base period is indicated by 
the earlier defined Base Total AMS. The commitment that is expressed 
each year and the support as agreed at the end of the reduction period 
are called the Annual and Final Bound Commitment Levels. The actual 
internal support given in a certain year in the implementation period is 
called the Current Total AMS. 
With respect to the policies that will be included or excluded in the 
AMS calculation the same procedure is followed as in the Dunkel paper. 
This means that internal support policies will be included except when 
they have a negligible trade distorting effect. In order to distinguish 
whether a policy measure belongs to this last category, two general cri-
teria have been formulated, which a policy measure should meet in 
order to be exempted from the AMS and thus the reduction commit-
ment. Moreover some specific criteria have been described for some 
particular policy measures. The previous had however already been pro-
posed in the Dunkel paper and has not changed since. 
What has changed however is that in the final agreement as com-
pared to the Dunkel paper, conditions have been agreed upon in order 
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to exempt direct payments under production-limiting programmes from 
the AMS calculation, as initiated by the Blair House agreement. Follow-
ing these conditions, direct payments under production-limiting pro-
grammes will be exempted from the commitment to reduce domestic 
support if such payments are based on fixed area and yields, or are made 
on 85% or less of the base level of production, or if livestock payments 
are made on a fixed number of heads. 
4.7 Conclusion: views of Contracting Parties compared with final GATT 
agreement 
As one can infer from the previous sections, dealing with the 
Dunkel paper, the Blair House agreement and the final GATT agreement 
of December 1993, for almost all the questions enumerated in the earlier 
mentioned checklist of Arthur Dunkel an answer has been provided. 
The question however is to what extent the answers conform to the 
points of view of the different Contracting Parties, as described in section 
4.3. When one compares the final GATT agreement with the views of the 
Contracting Parties with respect to the AMS, one can conclude that the 
final outcome is a real compromise of the views of the Contracting 
Parties. 
The optional use of the AMS proposed in the paper is two-fold, 
options I and III, which means the function of commitments on the basis 
of the AMS and the monitoring role. This was the proposal of the EC. 
However, although option I is proposed for the AMS, the AMS will only 
be applied to a very small area, namely the internal support area, with a 
lot of possible exemptions. The application area can therefore be 
regarded as very restricted, although the original intention was to devel-
op an AMS which would be able to capture all policies applied by the 
different Contracting Parties. 
The small application area proposed for the AMS is in fact a logical 
consequence of the negotiations. As one can see out of the alternatives 
for the traditional PSE as proposed by the different Contracting Parties 
{SMU, TDE, AMLOBS) and the comments given by other Contracting 
Parties, referring to the AMS, almost all Contracting Parties agreed upon 
the fact that only trade-distorting policy measures should be taken into 
account. As everybody was sure about the policies which should, without 
any doubt, be included in or excluded from the AMS, there was a big 
'grey' area of policies in between, for which no Contracting Party could 
give criteria on the basis of which they should be included or left out. 
The reason for this 'lack of clarity' was that the trade-distorting effects of 
these measures were unknown. However there was also a problem with 
respect to the measures which would for sure be included (the 'amber' 
policies). Policies like import quotas and voluntary export restraints 
should be included and would be measured by the price gap between 
the domestic price and an external reference price. However due to the 
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way they were measured and due to policy switching possibilities it was 
possible to reduce or remain the existing AMS level, while increasing 
trade distortion. On the other hand a realized reduction in import restric-
tions would not necessarily lead to a change in AMS. 
In the final GATT agreement this problem is proposed to be solved 
by excluding all market access and export subsidy policies from the AMS 
and subject them to 'traditional' commitments. Only the remaining policy 
measures, fall ing under the area of 'internal support' are included in the 
AMS and subject to reduction when they are regarded as trade-distort-
ing. To distinguish between measures that can reasonably be considered 
as trade-distorting and that cannot, in the final GATT agreement a set of 
criteria per policy measure has been developed. Policies that meet the 
criteria will not be subject to reduction, other policies not meeting the 
criteria wi l l . The resulting policy coverage is especially close to the policy 
coverage used in the AMLOBS as proposed by the Cairns Group. 
The issue of possible credits for countries applying supply control 
policies has been widely discussed by the Contracting Parties and was 
one of the main issues of the AMS. It is therefore at least surprising that 
the final GATT agreement does not spend many words on this problem. 
The only way in which the problem has gained attention in the final 
agreement is by way of the conditions provided to exempt direct pay-
ments under production-limiting programmes from internal support 
reduction. However nothing is said about possible credits. It has there-
fore to be assumed that no extra credit wil l be given above the effect 
measured by the difference between the domestic price and the external 
reference price and the production effect (as the AMS is expressed as a 
total monetary value), therewith neglecting the views of Canada and the 
EC, who were in favour of a credit. 
The last main discussion point of the AMS dealt wi th the problem of 
fluctuating external reference prices and exchange rates and the choice 
of the base year. With respect to the world price and exchange rate 
fluctuations, two opinions were expressed by the Contracting Parties. 
Most Contracting Parties were in favour of taking a (changing) average 
of the most recently available reference prices and exchange rates in 
order to best reflect the market reality and the current support situation. 
However the EC proposed in its SMU concept to use a fixed external 
reference price which would solve both the problem of fluctuating exter-
nal reference prices and the problem of fluctuating exchange rates. This 
way a change in AMS would reflect purely a change in policy. In the final 
agreement the stance is taken of a compromise in agreeing upon a fixed 
external reference price based on the three-year average of 1986 ti l l 
1988. 
With respect to the base year almost the same problem arose. Most 
countries were in favour of the most recent year of which data were 
available, while the EC was in favour of the year 1984/85, as this base 
year would best take into account the CAP reform measures started in 
this period. However after the Mid-Term Review where it was decided 
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that credits would be allowed for support reduction programmes already 
started before the base year finally chosen, the EC changed its stance 
and proposed 1986 as the base year. In the final agreement, though, it is 
decided to take the average of the years from 1986 till 1988 as reference 
period. 
Of course the final GATT agreement could be compared on even 
more issues with the Contracting Party proposals, like the way products 
are dealt with for which no AMS can be calculated, how inflation is 
treated etc. However as these issues have not caused principal disagree-
ment among the Contracting Parties, they will not be discussed here. 
80 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
When the Uruguay Round was launched in 1986 in Punta dei Este it 
was agreed to develop an Aggregate Measure of Support in order to 
provide transparency in the wide range of different existing policies and 
to bring them under one denominator. As the traditional method of 
negotiating in previous Rounds on the basis of request and offer was not 
suitable any more, a developed AMS should be the basis for binding 
reduction commitments for all three agricultural target areas, namely 
improvement of market access and export competition and reduction of 
the internal support. 
In spite of theoretically not being the best measure of support, the 
PSE was chosen as a basis for the discussion in stead of other (well-
known) measures like the NRPp, ERP, NRA and ERA. As analysed in chap-
ter two, the political preference of the PSE above the other measures 
was due to the combination of the PSE capturing the effects of many 
different policies and being calculated very easy by using price gaps and 
budgetary expenditure data. Moreover calculations of PSEs for various 
products were already available through the work of the OECD. 
The question which then naturally follows and which was also the 
aim of the analysis in this study, is whether the PSE is suitable to serve as 
an AMS in the Uruguay Round on the basis of which binding commit-
ments can be made. Schwartz and Parker (1988) state that an AMS used 
in negotiations to bind and cut protection should satisfy at least five 
criteria. 
1. Transparency; the measure should make the effects of policies trans-
parent; 
2. Simpleness and comprehensibility; as negotiators can minimize their 
t ime spent arguing over measurement issues and maximize their 
effort to reduce trade distortions; 
3. Flexibility; it should be flexible enough to accommodate policy 
reform packages necessary to manoeuvre for domestic political sup-
port, but not so flexible that parties can manipulate reforms in non-
bargained, self-serving ways; 
4. Consistency; it should be consistent across products, countries, and 
over time, so that outcomes of the measures can be compared and 
ranked; 
5. Reliability; it should be a reliable indicator of how changes in pol-
icies affect real economic variables; that is it should be positively 
correlated in a roughly linear manner wi th the main objectives of 
the negotiations. 
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To answer the above question, the PSE concept has been analysed 
in chapter three in order to see what the PSE is, what it does, the pro-
blems it faces and whether from a scientific/economic point of view the 
PSE is suitable to serve as a basis for reduction commitments. Also the 
practical problems that the PSE may face when used in the negotiations 
are dealt wi th. From this chapter it can be inferred that apart from the 
confusion in definit ion (the PSE measures revenue support, no income 
support), the PSE faces several conceptual problems like: 
a. intermediate input assistance is not fully taken into account; 
b. supply control policies are not adequately measured; 
c. policies hidden under the price gap; a wide range of policies is 
measured by the difference between domestic prices and external 
reference prices. The effects of individual policies on price and trade 
can therefore not be distinguished. It is therefore not known what 
change in PSE is due to what policy change; 
d. f luctuating world prices and exchange rates; fluctuating world prices 
and exchange rates change the PSE of a country wi thout this coun-
try having changed its policies; 
e. the PSE can be reduced while not changing real agricultural sup-
port. 
For the negotiations, all the conceptual problems the PSE faces can 
be summarized as follows: 
1. PSE levels are only partly under a country's control; 
2. PSEs do not adequately reflect trade distortions. 
These two problems very clearly show that the PSE does not meet 
the criteria of respectively consistency and reliability as put forward by 
Schwartz and Parker (1988). Thus from a scientific point of view one 
must state that in spite of its advantages the PSE is not suitable to be 
used as an AMS in negotiations on the basis of which binding commit-
ments can be made. Option I must therefore be excluded. Besides con-
sistency and reliability, also the criterion of transparency is a problem 
because the PSE measures a wide range of policies through the price 
gap, but the effects of individual policies are not shown. 
As also the Technical Group in the negotiations recognized quite 
early that option I would be difficult in practice, they put forward a few 
alternative optional uses for the AMS of which the most important are 
options II and III, respectively the 'target' role wi th commitments on the 
policies itself and the 'monitoring' role. The target role is especially inte-
resting as by agreeing commitments on the basis of the policies 
themselves, it can be avoided that trade distortion will increase while 
reducing the AMS/PSE. However one can ask oneself what the additional 
value would be of an AMS that is not used like in option I. It is therefore 
interesting to look at the opinions about the PSE or its derivatives as put 
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forward by the Contracting Parties in the negotiations and the finally 
agreed use of the AMS in the final GATT agreement, which have been 
analysed in chapter 4. 
As can be inferred from that chapter, most of the conceptual prob-
lems of the AMS as analysed in chapter 3 were also recognized in the 
GATT by the Negotiating Group on Agriculture (NG5) and the Technical 
Group. However some of these conceptual or technical problems appea-
red in the negotiations to be more policital, like the policy coverage and 
the choice of the reference price. Moreover also other questions were 
raised, not important for a conceptual analysis, but very important in the 
negotiations, such as the choice of the base year (important for the final 
commitments), commodity coverage and country coverage. Besides the 
discussion about those issues, the Contracting Parties proposed various 
derivatives, which should solve the earlier mentioned problems that the 
PSE faced. For example the EC proposed the SMU (PSE wi th fixed exter-
nal reference price, Canada the TDE (PSE which only takes into account 
the trade-distorting policies) and the Cairns Group proposed the AMLOBS 
(PSE only taking into account policies directly affecting production). 
The use of the AMS as agreed upon and described in the final GATT 
agreement wi th respect to the AMS can be regarded as a compromise 
between the proposals of the different Contracting Parties. In spite of 
what was concluded from a scientific point of view, the AMS was pro-
posed in the final agreement to be used as a basis for binding commit-
ments, which is in fact option I. The problems mentioned above, which 
the AMS faces in this option are solved by simply slimming the applica-
t ion area of the AMS to policies in the internal support area, therewith 
excluding all market access measures, like import levies, voluntary export 
restraints, etc, and export competition measures, like export subsidies, 
transport subsidization etc, which are subject to separate GATT commit-
ments. For the internal support area it was proposed that measures hav-
ing no or a negligable incidence on trade should be excluded from the 
AMS. To determine which policies could therefore be excluded, two gen-
eral criteria and specific criteria per policy measure were developed, 
which a policy should meet in order to be excluded. Theoretically there-
fore all internal support measures can be included. However the criteria 
developed in order to distinguish whether a policy is included or left out, 
offer such a large scale of exemption possibilities, that in practice the 
application area is very small. From the originally three categories of 
policies which could, one way or the other, be included: 
a. the border measures; 
b. direct payments; and 
c. input subsidies. 
only the input subsidies are fully captured. The border measures, as 
measured by the price gap have been reduced to only direct price or 
output subsidies, as all non-internal support has been removed from the 
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AMS and is subject to other commitments. All direct payments are sub-
ject to the mentioned exemption criteria for the decision of being 
included or excluded, or to the conditions for exemption as decribed for 
the direct payments under production-limiting programmes. 
However, in spite of the fact that the application area of the AMS is 
restricted to internal support, also for this area the AMS is still not an 
accurate one in that the trade-distortions are still not reflected the way 
they should be. For example the trade-distorting effect of an output 
subsidy is not the same as the trade-distorting effect of an input subsidy 
as shown by Hertel (1989) (see appendix 5). 
Summarizing one can state that the use of the AMS in the Uruguay 
Round as agreed upon and described in the final GATT agreement essen-
tially is in accordance with the scientific conclusion, namely that the AMS 
is not suitable to serve as a basis on which binding commitments can be 
made and which could therefore replace the original negotiating 
method of request and offer. Though in the final GATT agreement this is 
not said with so many words, it can be concluded from the fact that, 
although in the final GATT agreement the AMS is used as a basis for bin-
ding commitments, it is applied to such a small range of policies that in 
practice the AMS use is minimal. 
The contribution of the economic science to the AMS discussion was 
reflected by the PSE. The AMS namely is the PSE concept adapted on 
various elements in order to better comply with the wishes of the Con-
tracting Parties. However, looking at the many problems of the PSE, 
when practically used in the negotiations and the final proposed 
slimmed use of the AMS in the final GATT agreement, one must con-
clude in fairness, that the economic science has not been able to deliver 
an AMS that is suitable to meet all the criteria as enumerated at the start 
of this chapter, necessary for use on a large scale in the negotiations. 
One option people are working on at the moment are models for which 
the PSE is used as an input, which try to determine the world trade 
effects of certain levels of protection. However as has been clearly dem-
onstrated in this study, when used as a negotiating basis, it is insufficient 
to develop an AMS that solves most of the conceptual and technical 
problems it faces now in the negotiations. Many technical problems turn 
out to be political. Therefore it is impossible to develop an AMS that 
meets all the criteria, both conceptual and political and which can be 
used in all three negotiation areas of the Uruguay Round. It is therefore 
to be expected that in the negotiating Rounds to come, still much 
emphasis will be put on the traditional request and offer method as no 
acceptable alternatives are available. 
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Appendix 1 Mathematical formulas and policy coverage of five 
measures of support 
Nominal Rate of Protection for producers (NRPp): 
NRPpj = (PD, - PW)IPW, x 100 <=> 
(PDj/PWj -1)x100 
Effective Rate of Protection (ERP): 
ERPj = (VAD, - VAWJ/VAW, x 100 <=> 
x 100 <=> 
I-S?;; 
NRPp, - ATj 
x100 
1 -A 
Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) or Price Adjustment Gap (PAG): 
NRAj = PAG, = (RD, - PW)IPW, x 100 
Effective Rate of Assistance (ERA): 
ERA, = (AVA, - UVAJ/UVA, x 100 <=> 
x, - Sja,j(Xj) 
= x 700 <=> 
1
-¥v 
NRA, - AX, 
= x 100 
1 -A 
Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE): 
PSE, = (PD, - PW)Q, + (AT'j + B', + C', + D)<=> 
(NRPp)PWjQ, + (ATj + B', + C, + D) 
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For the ith commodity and the jth intermediate input: 
av = undistorted input-output coefficient; 
A = set of input-output coefficients (Sa,-); 
AVAj = assisted value added per unit of output; 
Bj = net subsidies on primary inputs (capital, labour, land); 
B'j = subset of B-
Cj = output policies that do not affect PDi; 
Cj = subset of CJ; 
Dj = long-term structural program costs for the jth good; 
PDj = domestic producer price; 
PWj = undistorted (world) price; 
Qj = domestic quantity produced; 
RDj = unit gross returns to producers for domestic output; 
Sj = Sum;. 
tj = NRPp on the jth output; 
tj = NRPc on the jth intermediate input; 
NRPc = (PCDj - PWj)/PWj in which: 
NRPc = Nominal Rate of Protection for consumers 
PCDj = domestic consumer price 
T: = set of all net taxes on intermediate goods, tj 
Tj = subset of Tj (varies depending on PSE definition); 
UVAj = unassisted value added per unit of output; 
VADj = value-added at domestic prices; 
VAWj = value-added at world prices; 
Xj = NRA on the jth output; 
X: = NRA on the jth intermediate input; 
X: = set of all net assistance on intermediate inputs, x. 
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Appendix 2 Policy coverage of five aggregate measurements 
Policy coverage Aggregate measurements 
NRPp PAG ERP PSE ERA 
Assistance to output 
Via market prices 
- tariffs, export taxes, 
import quotas 
- two-price schemes 
Via other means 
- export incentives, 
inspection 
- stabilization activity and 
funds 
• production bounties 
- acreage diversion payments 
- subsidized marketing costs 
Assistance to inputs 
Intermediate Input Subsidies 
and Taxes 
- Primary Input Subsidies 
and Taxes 
Research, Long-term 
Structural Policies 
- research and extension 
- farm adjustment 
- conservation programmes 
- income tax concessions 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
**\ 
**\ 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
*) 
*) 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
x *) 
X *) 
X *) 
x *) 
X 
X 
X 
X 
*) These policies are only included in the PSE, when they are Agriculture-Specific. Agri-
culture-Specific refers to policies that are specific to agriculture and generally not used in 
the rest of the economy, e.g. fertilizer subsidies. Precisely which policies are included 
depends on the definition of the PSE being used; **) Only the measures that influence 
the prices of the inputs are incorporated. 
The information in the tables is derived from work by Haszler and Parsons 
(1987), Industries Assistance Commission (1983), Scandizzo and Bruce (1980), 
Schwartz and Parker (1988), Strak (1982), US Department of Agriculture (1987), 
Webb (1984) and my own contribution. 
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Appendix 3 Overview of policy measures in PSE estimates, their 
conceptual approach and a few examples 
Policies Conceptual approach Examples 
A. MARKET PRICE SUPPORT 
1. import quotas/variable 
levies state trading 
2. tariffs only 
3. two price systems 
4. export refunds 
5. marketing boards 
6. US grains & soybeans 
CCC inventory 
cost 
commodity loans 
7. price premiums fluid 
milk 
8. export credits, food 
aid, export enhance-
ment 
price difference 
(border price-domestic 
price) * domestic prod. 
tariff($/ton) * domestic 
production 
price difference 
(border price-domestic 
price) * domestic cons. 
assumed to be captured 
by price differences 
AUS:interest subsidy on 
funds use by AWB 
CA: govt, contributions 
to stabilization fund 
'budget' data: economic 
cost of CCC inventory 
operations, derived from 
CCC financial data 
'budget' data: interest 
subsidy on loans (market 
rate - CCC rate) * loan 
volume 
price difference 
(fluid price - manufactured 
price) * fluid use * weight 
not included in ERS or 
OECD estimates 
sugar:US,EC,JAP 
rice, wheat: EC,JAP 
beef:EC,JAP 
corn:EC 
pork:JAP,EC 
poultry:EC,JAP 
milk:US,EC,CA,JAP 
US:beef 
JAP: poultry 
CA:sugar,corn 
AUS:wheat,rice 
CA:wheat,oats 
ECwheat, beef.sugar 
AUS:wheat; 
CA:wheat, barley 
US:grains,cotton, 
soybeans 
US:grains,cotton, 
soybeans 
CA,US,AUS 
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Policies Conceptual approach Examples 
B. DIRECT INCOME SUPPORT 
1. direct cash payments 
(disaster, headage, 
deficiency, paid land 
diversion, stabilization) 
2. producer levies 
C. INPUT SUBSIDIES 
1. crop insurance 
2. concessional credit 
farm operations 
3. fuel subsidies 
4. fertilizer subsidies 
budget data 
budget data: negative 
support 
'budget' data: premiums 
indemnities (US.CA) + 
premium subsidy (US); 
government outlays (JAP) 
'budget' data 
US, AUS: (market interest 
rate - programme rate) * 
loan volume. US: add 
appropriate for losses, 
ACIF; CA: budget outlays 
'budget' data. CA: govt, 
outlays. US: $ value 
fuel tax non-agr. users 
* fuel use in agriculture 
'budget' data. Subsidy/ 
ton * fertilizer use 
US:all grains, cotton 
EGsoybeans, 
rapeseed 
JAP: rice, wheat 
CA: grains.soybeans, 
pork, beef 
EGdairy.sugar 
US:dairy 
US,JAP:crop,specific 
data 
CA:allocated by 
cash receipts 
US, CA, AUS: 
all commodities 
US,CA:all 
commodities 
AUS:all crops 
D. MARKETING PROGRAMMES 
1. processing, inspection, 
marketing, programmes 
2. transportation 
budget data 
budget data 
CA: railway programmes, 
allocated generally by 
cash receipts. US, COE 
and railway budget data 
most coun-
tries, all 
commodities 
CA:grains & 
oilseeds; 
US:all 
commodities 
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Policies Conceptual approach Examples 
E. LONG-TERM POLICIES 
1. research, extension, 
structures, conservation 
budget data most countries, 
all commodities 
F. EXCHANGE RATES 
1. fixed or pegged 
exchange rates 
calculate parity exchange 
rate ratio based on 
relative purchasing power 
vis-a-vis US. Apply 
exchange rate distortion 
/ton to total production 
Nigeria, 
Mexico, Brazil 
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Appendix 4 Gross domestic production and consumer price index 
used as deflators for the EC 12, the US and Japan 
Table 1 
Year 
Gross Domestic Production, EC 12, US and Japan 
Deflator Index 1986 = 100 
EC 12 US JAPAN EC 12 US JAPAN 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
11.0 
13.0 
10.9 
10.4 
8.4 
7.0 
6.0 
5.5 
4.0 
4.4 
4.9 
4.6 
8.9 
9.2 
9.5 
6.5 
3.4 
3.6 
2.7 
2.6 
3.1 
3.4 
4.7 
4.6 
3.0 
3.7 
3.3 
1.9 
0.8 
1.2 
1.4 
1.9 
-0.2 
0.5 
3.1 
3.0 
55.71 
62.98 
69.82 
77.10 
83.59 
89.41 
94.75 
100.00 
104.00 
108.59 
113.91 
119.15 
69.68 
76.06 
83.26 
88.63 
91.63 
94.91 
97.48 
100.00 
103.05 
106.53 
111.50 
116.64 
86.96 
90.19 
93.12 
94.87 
95.60 
96.78 
98.11 
100.00 
98.83 
100.30 
103.39 
106.48 
Table 2 
Year 
Consumer Price Index, EC 12, US and Japan 
Deflator 
EC 12 US JAPAN 
Index 1986 = 100 
EC 12 US JAPAN 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
10.9 
13.5 
12.0 
10.6 
8.4 
7.3 
5.9 
3.8 
3.4 
3.7 
4.2 
3.8 
9.3 
11.0 
9.3 
6.0 
3.5 
3.9 
3.1 
2.2 
4.2 
4.1 
5.1 
4.9 
3.6 
7.1 
4.4 
2.6 
1.9 
2.1 
2.2 
0.5 
-0.1 
0.3 
3.2 
2.7 
55.60 
63.13 
70.71 
78.18 
84.78 
91.00 
96.33 
100.00 
103.39 
107.20 
111.71 
115.99 
68.65 
76.19 
83.24 
88.25 
91.30 
94.87 
97.85 
100.00 
104.24 
108.50 
114.00 
119.58 
81.64 
87.44 
91.27 
93.65 
95.38 
97.36 
99.50 
100.00 
99.87 
100.16 
103.33 
106.14 
Source: Commission of the European Communities, 1990. 
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Appendix 5 Eleven propositions on the effect of alternative types 
of agricultural subsidies 
Establishing the link between output and exports 
1. Introducing direct farm subsidies on inputs or outputs tends to increase 
aggregate production. The resulting proportional increase in farm exports 
will exceed the proportional rise in agricultural production when demand is 
more price responsive than domestic demand for farm products. 
Comparing output and input subsidies 
2. Removal of an agricultural input subsidy will have a greater impact on long-
run output (and hence exports) than will the removal of an equal-PSE out-
put subsidy, provided the subsidized input is a substitute for land. 
3. The drop in the long-run price of land following a given PSE reduction will 
tend to be more moderate (or perhaps even reversed) in those cases where 
the PSF is reduced by cutting a subsidy on an input which is a substitute for 
land, as opposed to cutting an output subsidy. 
4. The largest effects on long-run employment will tend to arise when pro-
ducer support is directed towards subsidizing inputs that (i) are a substitute 
for land and (ii) are complementary with labour. 
5. The effect of equal PSE input and output subsidies will be equivalent only 
when the subsidized input is always employed in a fixed proportion to out-
put, regardless of relative prices. 
Comparing output and export subsidies 
6. When domestic and export demand elasticities are equal, replacing an out-
put subsidy with an export subsidy of equal cost increases exports. The asso-
ciated factor of proportionality equals the ratio of total output to exports. 
When export demand is more price responsive this factor of proportionality 
becomes even larger. 
7. The impact on the farm sector of an export subsidy will generally exceed 
that of an output subsidy of equal cost. The associated factor of proportion-
ality is determined by the ratio of the elasticity of demand for exports to 
the elasticity of demand for aggregate farm output. 
8. When an output subsidy is replaced by an export subsidy of equal cost, 
domestic consumers must pay more for food. When the elasticities of 
domestic and export demand are the same, the increase in domestic prices 
equals the amount the government was spending on the output subsidy. 
When export demand is relatively more price responsive, domestic prices for 
farm products increase by more than the subsidy. 
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9. Replacing an output subsidy with an equal PSE export subsidy will reduce 
government budget expenditures by a factor of proportionality equal to the 
ratio of exports to domestic production. Assuming that the export demand 
for farm products is more price responsive than domestic demand, such a 
switch will also lower revenues per unit of production to domestic farmers. 
Acreage controls 
10. Acreage controls will reduce long-run output and exports, while increasing 
land rents. In the long run, agricultural employment will increase as a result 
of acreage controls if the substitutability of labour for land exceeds the 
absolute value of the elasticity of demand for total farm output. 
11. Long-run returns to land can be left unchanged after removal of an output 
subsidy if this removal is accompanied by acreage controls of appropriate 
magnitude. The size of this acreage reduction is proportional to the elastic-
ity of demand for farm output. 
Source: Hertel, 1989. 
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Appendix 6 Classification of support measures in the TDE as 
proposed by Canada 
1. Non-Distorting Measures 
1.1 Research; 
1.2 Extension/Education; 
1.3 Markets Information; 
1.4 Inspection/Grading; 
1.5 Non-commodity-specific Infrastructure Development; 
1.6 Domestic Food Aid (e.g. food stamps, school lunches); 
1.7 Unconditional Foreign Grant Food Aid; 
1.8 Disaster Payments; 
1.9 Generally-available (non-commodity-specific) Income Support Payments 
not based on commodity output or resource input levels; 
1.10 Resource Adjustment Assistance (e.g. grants/subsidies for relocation, 
retraining, retirement, farm-based tourism development, etc, and job 
market information); 
1.11 Conservation and Resource Retirement Payments, and Input Use (e.g. 
fertilizer) Taxes for Ecological and Environmental Purposes; 
1.12 Transitional Compensation Payments for Wealth or Income Losses due 
to Policy Changes (only where production-neutral: e.g. commodity-spe-
cific payments based on an individual's recorded level of plan-
ting/production/marketing/quota in a period prior to the first an-
nouncement of the programme); 
1.13 Government-funded Stockholding Activities. 
1.14 Farm Development/Investment Grants, Subsidies (including interest rate 
subsidies) and Tax Incentives generally available to the whole farm 
sector (i.e. non-commodity-specific: e.g. for all types of land drainage, 
irrigation, fencing, farm buildings and for farm purchase); 
1.15 Non-commodity-Specific Purchased Input Subsidies and Tax Incentives 
(e.g. for fuel, non-specific fertilizers, hired labour etc); 
2. Partially-Distorting Measures 
2.1 Government-Funded Stabilization and Crop Insurance Schemes; 
2.2 Market Price Support associated with: 
a. Transferable and Negotiable Production Quotas held at the individ-
ual producer level and for which a market-determined price can be 
readily observed; 
b. Effective over-quota penalty levies equal to at least the difference 
between the supported price and the equivalent world price; 
2.3 Deficiency Payments linked to or conditional on: 
a. Resource Withdrawal with a demonstrable supply impact (e.g. set-
aside requirements); and/or 
b. Historic (non-current) yield bases; 
3. Fully-Distorting Measures 
3.1 Commodity-Specific Farm Development/Investment Grants, Subsidies 
(including interest rate subsidies) and Tax Incentives (e.g. available only 
for specialized crop harvesting machinery, livestock equipment or stor-
age facilities); 
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3.2 Commodity-Specific Purchased Input Subsidies and Tax Incentives (e.g. 
crop harvesting labour, crop-specific fertilizers or agricultural chemi-
cals); 
3.3 Open-ended Output-based Deficiency Payment or Fixed Subsidy Sup-
port; 
3.4 Open-ended Market Price Support via some combination of: 
a. Quantitative or other import restrictions; 
b. Fixed or variable import levies/tariffs; 
c. Fixed or variable export restitutions/subsidies (including transport 
subsidies, concessional food aid, subsidized credit and targeted sub-
sidies); 
Source: GATT, 1988a. 
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Appendix 7 Articles XI and XVI of the GATT 
Article XI: 
General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions 
1. No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, 
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other 
measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the 
importation of any product or the territory of any other contracting party or 
on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the terri-
tory of any other contracting party. 
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not extend to the follow-
ing: 
(a) Export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or 
relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the 
exporting contracting party; 
(b) Import and export prohibitions or restrictions necessary to the applica-
tion of standards or regulations for the classification, grading or market-
ing of commodities in international trade; 
(c) Import restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries product, imported in 
any form, necessary to the enforcement of governmental measures 
which operate: 
(i) to restrict the quantities of the like domestic product permitted to 
be marketed or produced, or, if there is no substantial domestic 
production of the like product of a domestic product for which 
the imported product can be directly substituted; or 
(ii) to remove a temporary surplus of the like domestic product, or, if 
there is no substantial domestic production of the like product, of 
a domestic product for which the imported product can be directly 
substituted, by making the surplus available to certain groups of 
domestic consumers free of charge or at prices below the current 
market level; or 
(iii) to restrict the quantities permitted to be produced of any animal 
product the production of which is directly dependent, wholly or 
mainly, on the imported commodity, if the domestic production of 
that commodity is relatively negligible. 
Any contracting party applying restrictions on the importation of any pro-
duct pursuant to sub-paragraph (c) of this paragraph shall give public notice of 
the total quantity or value of the product permitted to be imported during a 
specified future period and of any change in such quantity or value. Moreover, 
any restrictions applied under (i) above shall not be such as will reduce the total 
of imports relative to the total of domestic production, as compared with the 
proportion which might reasonably be expected to rule between the two in the 
absence of restrictions. In determining this proportion, the contracting party 
shall pay due regard to the proportion prevailing during a previous representa-
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tive period and to any special factors which may have affected or may be affec-
ting the trade in the product concerned. 
Article XVI: 
Subsidies 
Section A-Subsidies in General 
1. If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy, including any form 
of income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase 
exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any product into, its 
territory, it shall notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES in writing of the extent 
and nature of the subsidization, of the estimated effect of the subsidization 
on the quantity of the affected product or products imported into or 
exported from its territory and of the circumstances making the subsidiza-
tion necessary. In any case in which it is determined that serious prejudice to 
the interests of any other contracting party granting the subsidy shall, upon 
request, discuss with the other contracting party or parties concerned, or 
with the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the possibility of limiting the subsidization. 
Section B-Additional Provisions on Export Subsidies* 
2. The contracting parties recognize that the granting by a contracting party of 
a subsidy on the export of any product may have harmful effects for other 
contracting parties, both importing and exporting, may cause undue distur-
bance to their normal commercial interests, and may hinder the achievement 
of the objectives of this Agreement. 
3. Accordingly, contracting parties should seek to avoid the use of subsidies on 
the export of primary products. If, however, a contracting party grants 
directly or indirectly any form of subsidy which operates to increase the 
export of any primary product from its territory, such subsidy shall not be 
applied in a manner which results in that contracting party having more 
than an equitable share of world export trade in that product, account 
being taken of the shares of the contracting parties in such trade in the 
product during a previous representative period, and any special factors 
which may have affected or may be affecting such trade in the product. 
4. Further, as from 1 January 1958 or the earliest practicable date thereafter, 
contracting parties shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any form 
of subsidy on the export of any product other than a primary product which 
subsidy results in the sale of such product for export at a price lower than 
the comparable price charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic 
market. Until 31 December 1957 no contracting party shall extend the scope 
of any such subsidization beyond that existing on 1 January 1955 by the 
introduction of new, or the extension of existing, subsidies. 
5. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall review the operation of the provisions of 
this Article from time to time with a view to examining its effectiveness, in 
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the light of actual experience, in promoting the objectives of this Agreement 
and avoiding subsidization seriously prejudicial to the trade or interests of 
contracting parties. 
Source: GATT (1969). 
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Appendix 8 The influence of the choice of the base year in using 
the PSE or the SMU concept 
Figure 1 Schematic description of PSE and SMU (per unit of production) 
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Table 1 Required percentage price reduction of milk, sugar beet, and beef, to meet in 
1988 *) a 10, 15 or 20% reduction in Total SMU compared to different base 
years; EC 10 **) 
Product Base year 
1984 1985 1986 
10% 15% 20% 10% 15% 20% 10% 15% 20% 
Milk***) -9.2 -4.8 -0.5 -7.1 -2.7 -1.6 -6.4 -2.1 2.2 
Sugar beet -2.6 0.8 4.3 2.7 6.2 9.6 0.0 3.5 7.0 
Beef 2.1 4.8 7.6 1.4 4.1 6.9 0.2 2.9 5.7 
*) Latest available estimates October 1988; **) Negative price reduction indicates poten-
tial price increase; ***) A milk quota credit is considered for the SMU calculation. 
Table 2 Required percentage price reduction of milk, sugar beet and beef, to meet in 
1988 *) a 10, 15 or 20% reduction in Total PSE compared to different base 
years; EC 10 **) 
Product Base year 
1984 1985 1986 
10% 15% 20% 10% 15% 20% 10% 15% 20% 
Milk 7.7 10.5 13.4 1.3 4.1 6.9 -8.4 -5.6 -2.7 
Sugar beet -0.8 2.5 5.8 -0.4 2.9 6.2 -3.0 0.3 3.6 
Beef 5.6 8.3 11.1 1.2 3.9 6.7 2.8 5.6 8.3 
*) Latest available estimates October 1988; **) Negative price reduction indicates poten-
tial price increase. 
Source: Commission of the European Communities, 1988e. 
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Appendix 9 Synopsis of views expressed on the AMS by various 
contracting parties 
Issue Contracting Party 
Cairns Canada 
Options 
I to IV 
Policy 
coverage 
and de-
coupling 
Product 
coverage 
Options II and III 
All measures, focusing on the 
removal of trade-distorting 
subsidies and access barriers. 
Exceptions direct decoupled 
income assistance (non-com-
modity-specific); natural dis-
aster assistance. Subnational 
policies should be included 
as appropriate. 
Widest possible range of 
agricultural products. Early 
Country 
coverage 
Referen-
ce year 
action: products for which 
output-based support is 
greater than 10 percent 
Early action (1989-90) by cer-
tain developed countries; Fuller 
participation there-after 
Most recent (1988) 
See Cairns 
All measures having a trade-
distorting effect (TDE), 
including market price 
support, direct income 
payments and reduction of 
import costs both at national 
and subnational level 
At first stage the more 
important and homogeneous 
products, in the long run 
being extended with other 
products 
See Cairns 
See Cairns. Same year/period 
for all countries and 
commodities 
Referen-
ce price 
Monetary 
fluctu-
ations 
OECD methodology (country 
specific border price for 
competing products) 
OECD methodology (possible 
moving average) 
Reference price as close as 
possible to current world 
market conditions and ex-
change rate situation. Quality 
and transport factors. C.i.fV 
f.o.b. smoothing 
See Cairns 
Supply Adequately measured by Total 
control PSE. No special adjustment 
technically required 
Pragmatic approach: 
adjustment where supply is 
controlled at world market 
price level 
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Issue 
Options 
I to IV 
Policy 
coverage 
and de-
coupling 
Product 
coverage 
Country 
coverage 
Referen-
ce year 
Contracting Party 
EC 
Short term: Options 1 and 
III (SMU) 
Measures having a signifi-
cant impact on producers. 
including market support and 
direct income payments. 
Possible exceptions 
Products in surplus so far as 
short-term SMU commitments 
are concerned. Maybe other 
products at a later stage 
As wide as possible: neces-
sary to have developing coun-
tries participation even if 
their PSEs are negative 
1984/85: policy profile for all 
countries and commodities but 
Jamaica 
PSB technique implying 
binding of specific 
commitments and trans-
parency. Options ll/IV 
Both the question of what 
could be understood to be 
a binding of a policy which 
goes beyond trade policy and 
decoupled income support 
require more discussion 
Possibilities to use the PSE 
for processed agricultural 
products should be examined 
(raw material equivalent) 
Not specified 
Year of period prior to 1986 
Punta stand-still 
different external reference 
prices used to calculate base 
SMU 
Referen- Lowest external reference 
ce price price, as calculated by the 
OECD (1979-87) to be selec-
ted according to country and 
commodity. Remains fixed 
Monetary Resolved through fixed re-
fluctuations ference prices 
Supply OECD methodology to be mo-
control dified so as to provide for 
credits for effective supply 
controls. Case-by-case: con-
servation programmes but not 
set aside linked to deficiency 
payments 
Requires more discussion 
The present methodology 
(OECD) does not adequately 
address the problem, notably 
in the case of developing 
countries 
Supply controls should not 
result in import or export 
restrictions nor be detrimental 
for term of trade of net food 
importing countries 
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Issue Contracting Party 
Nordics US 
Options 
I to IV 
Policy 
coverage 
and de-
coupling 
Product 
coverage 
Options II and III 
Measures which have only mi-
nor trade effects could be 
excluded. They should, how-
ever, be clearly defined. 
Most of the development as-
sistance programmes could be 
excluded. Sub-national poli-
cies included as appropriate 
OECD product coverage as 
starting point 
Country 
coverage 
Reference 
year 
Reference 
price 
Support a pragmatic approach 
in developing the PSE in or 
-der to widen the eventual 
country coverage 
Multi-year average preceding 
immediately the Punta com-
mitment 
Depends on option selected. 
Under III, it is feasible to use 
Monetary 
fluctu-
ations 
fluctuating market prices. 
Common reference prices 
if used, should reflect the 
world market situation. 
C.i.f/f.o.b. smoothing 
As for reference prices. Mo-
ving average/currency basket 
worth exploring. Inflation 
should be taken into account 
Options II and III 
All measures, excluding bona 
fide food aids and decoupled 
safety net payments. 
Case should be made for 
excluding other items. Sub-
national measures should be 
includes as appropriate 
All agricultural products, fish 
and forestry products. Surplus 
products possible criterion for 
starting point. Move on to 
products where trade restric-
tions/problems are the 
greatest 
As wide as possible 
Need for logical basis and 
mutual acceptability. Should 
reflect current levels of sup-
port. 1986, or 1988 if process 
starts in 1989 
Should reflect market 
reality 
OECD methodology. Pos-
sibility of averaging not 
excluded 
Supply Supply controls should be ta-
control ken into account through 
the use of Total PSE. Diver-
sion payments should be ex-
cluded from PSE calculation 
-tion (for some time) 
Adequately reflected in 
Total PSE. No blanket credit. 
Resources would have to be 
withdrawn from production. 
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